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Effective Program Reasoning Using Bayesian Inference
Abstract
Program analysis tools that statically find bugs in software still report a deluge of false alarms
notwithstanding their widespread adoption. This is because they must necessarily make approximations
in order to scale to large and complex programs. The focus of this dissertation is to make static program
analyses more effective by guiding them towards true bugs and away from false alarms. We do this by
augmenting logical program reasoning with probabilistic reasoning. We seek to overcome the
incompleteness of a static analysis by associating each alarm it produces with a probability that it is a
true alarm. We compute alarm probabilities by performing Bayesian inference on a probabilistic model
derived from the execution of the analysis. Moreover, the probabilistic model allows us to recompute the
probabilities by conditioning them on new evidence, thereby allowing to tailor the analysis to individual
codebases and user needs. The alarms are ranked by the computed probabilities to mitigate the burden
of inspecting false alarms.
We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach in two practical systems. In one system, we leverage
user feedback to iteratively improve the alarm ranking. The system starts with an initial ranking of alarms
reported by the static analysis. In each iteration, the system seeks user feedback for the top-ranked
alarm. Next, it generalizes this feedback by recomputing the probabilities of all the alarms conditioned on
this feedback to produce an improved ranking for the next iteration. After a few iterations, true alarms rise
to the top of the ranking, thus alleviating the burden of inspecting false alarms. In the second system, we
leverage the completeness of dynamic analysis that is capable of observing concrete program
executions, to rank the alarms reported by the static analysis. We hypothesize that a reported alarm is at
most as complete as the analysis facts it is premised upon. For each analysis fact used by the static
analysis in deducing an alarm, the system seeks a probability estimate for its completeness, from a
dynamic analysis. The dynamic analysis estimates this by counting the number of times it observes the
analysis fact during concrete program executions. The system then uses the estimated probabilities
associated with the analysis facts to infer probabilities for alarms, and ranks alarms by the inferred
probabilities.
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ABSTRACT
EFFECTIVE PROGRAM REASONING USING BAYESIAN INFERENCE
Sulekha Kulkarni
Mayur Naik
Program analysis tools that statically find bugs in software still report a deluge of
false alarms notwithstanding their widespread adoption. This is because they must
necessarily make approximations in order to scale to large and complex programs.
The focus of this dissertation is to make static program analyses more effective
by guiding them towards true bugs and away from false alarms. We do this by
augmenting logical program reasoning with probabilistic reasoning. We seek to
overcome the incompleteness of a static analysis by associating each alarm it produces
with a probability that it is a true alarm. We compute alarm probabilities by
performing Bayesian inference on a probabilistic model derived from the execution
of the analysis. Moreover, the probabilistic model allows us to recompute the
probabilities by conditioning them on new evidence, thereby allowing to tailor the
analysis to individual codebases and user needs. The alarms are ranked by the
computed probabilities to mitigate the burden of inspecting false alarms.
We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach in two practical systems. In
one system, we leverage user feedback to iteratively improve the alarm ranking. The
system starts with an initial ranking of alarms reported by the static analysis. In
each iteration, the system seeks user feedback for the top-ranked alarm. Next, it
generalizes this feedback by recomputing the probabilities of all the alarms conditioned
on this feedback to produce an improved ranking for the next iteration. After a few
iterations, true alarms rise to the top of the ranking, thus alleviating the burden
of inspecting false alarms. In the second system, we leverage the completeness of
dynamic analysis that is capable of observing concrete program executions, to rank
the alarms reported by the static analysis. We hypothesize that a reported alarm is at
v

most as complete as the analysis facts it is premised upon. For each analysis fact used
by the static analysis in deducing an alarm, the system seeks a probability estimate
for its completeness, from a dynamic analysis. The dynamic analysis estimates this
by counting the number of times it observes the analysis fact during concrete program
executions. The system then uses the estimated probabilities associated with the
analysis facts to infer probabilities for alarms, and ranks alarms by the inferred
probabilities.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1

The Effectiveness of Program Reasoning

Program analysis tools, such as Facebook Infer [16], Clang Static Analyzer [2],
Coverity Static Analyzer [9], and many others [12, 8, 69], have been developed over
the last twenty years to statically find bugs in software. These tools rely on logical
modes of reasoning about programs, such as abstract interpretation and symbolic
execution, in order to find bugs. To be useful in realistic software development
environments, such tools need to be sound, scalable, and precise. The soundness of a
bug-finding program analysis tool ensures that no bug in the analyzed program is
missed by the tool. The scalability of the tool measures the size of the program that
it is able to reason about. The precision of the tool measures the fraction of the total
reported bugs that are indeed true bugs. It is extremely difficult for a static program
analysis tool to be simultaneously sound, scalable, as well as precise; optimizing for
any one of these requirements compromises the others. In order to scale to large
programs, a static program analysis tool must necessarily make approximations that
may cause it to be imprecise and possibly unsound.
In practice, static program analysis tools strive to be effective by achieving an
acceptable but delicate balance between the competing requirements of scalability,
1

soundness, and precision. These tools achieve this balance by employing a mixture of
sound and unsound approximations. In addition, the tools also provide configurable
parameters that give tool users control over the tool’s scalability, soundness, and
precision. Tool users can fine-tune the values of the configurable parameters to
optimize the tool’s performance in specific software engineering environments. These
configurations are, at best, ad hoc methods to improve the effectiveness of a static
analysis tool. In sum, making static program analysis tools effective in practical
environments remains a challenge.

1.2

The Problem of False Alarms

One of the major impediments to the effectiveness of static program analysis tools
is the large number of false alarms they report. In other words, the static analyses
employed by these tools have low precision. A user has to triage all the reported
alarms in order to find the true alarms that are few and far apart. It is common for
tool users to tune a tool’s configurable parameters to report fewer false alarms in
order to reduce the burden of inspecting these alarms, but parameter tuning is an ad
hoc approach that may cause the tool to suppress alarms that are indeed critical bugs.
For example, the Coverity Static Analyzer employs sound approximations that make
it scalable, but these approximations cause the tool to report a large number of false
alarms. The tool suppresses many of these false alarms using other approximations
that are unsound. As a result, the Coverity Static Analyzer failed to detect a critical
security bug famously known as the Heartbleed bug [3]. Similarly, the Clang Static
Analyzer performs under-constrained symbolic execution in order to scale. While this
approach is sound, it causes the analyzer to be imprecise and report a large number
of false alarms. The tool provides certain configurable parameters to suppress false
alarms, like parameters that govern when copy/move constructors need to be inlined
for analysis, or when bug-paths that go through null returns need to be suppressed.

2

While such ad hoc methods may improve the tool’s effectiveness in a given context,
they may potentially suppress critical bugs. Therefore, we need systematic ways to
distinguish true bugs from the false alarms.
In this dissertation, we focus on the problem of finding true bugs interspersed
among numerous false alarms. We present a principled and general approach to
rank the alarms reported by bug-finding static program analysis tools in order of
their decreasing likelihood of being true alarms. By ranking alarms, we mitigate the
burden of inspecting false alarms, thereby improving the effectiveness of such tools
in practical settings. In our approach, we use the well-known fact that alarms are
correlated: multiple true alarms often share root causes, and multiple false alarms
are often caused by the inability of the analysis to prove some shared intermediate
fact about the analyzed program. Indeed, a large body of previous research is aimed
at alarm clustering [46, 48], ranking [42, 41], and classification [55, 81, 34].

1.3

A Probabilistic Approach to Ranking Alarms

We propose and implement a general approach to ranking the alarms reported by a
static analysis by the alarms’ probability of being true. Our approach augments the
logical reasoning of a static analysis with probabilistic reasoning. This augmentation
enables us to quantitatively model the incompleteness in static analyses, which is the
primary source of false alarms. Our approach uses this model to infer a probability
for each alarm that quantifies how likely the alarm is to be true. Next, our approach
ranks alarms by their computed probabilities. Such a ranking has the potential to
greatly improve the practical effectiveness of static program reasoning tools because
it mitigates the burden of inspecting false alarms.
In our approach, we extract a probabilistic model of the execution of the static
analysis and perform inference on that model. The probabilistic model is a Bayesian
network, and it models both: (a) the analysis facts produced, and (b) the deduction

3

steps executed by the static analysis while analyzing a program. In addition, the
probabilistic model captures how each deduced analysis fact is conditionally dependent
on its premises. Performing Bayesian inference on this model gives us a way to
associate probabilities with all the analysis facts when we know the probabilities of
certain analysis facts like input facts, or when we are given zero or more observations.
Because an alarm is an analysis fact deduced by the static analysis, we can now
associate an alarm with a probability. Furthermore, our probabilistic model allows us
to recompute all the probabilities conditioned on new evidence that may be observed.
In this dissertation, we work with static program analyses that are specified as
logical rules in Datalog, although our approach is applicable to all static program
analyses that rely on reasoning techniques such as abstract interpretation. Datalog is
a logic programming language widely used to declaratively specify complex program
analyses [73, 79, 15, 6, 54, 5]. From the deductive steps applied by such analyses, we
observe that correlated alarms share significant portions of their derivation trees (the
sequence of analysis steps executed by the static analysis in deriving the alarm). The
union of all instantiated analysis steps occurring in these derivation trees induces a
derivation graph. The derivation graph serves as our starting point to capturing the
(transitive) dependence of an analysis fact on its premises and, as a consequence, it
enables us to capture alarm correlations as well.
We extract a Bayesian network from this derivation graph by representing each
instantiated deduction rule (i.e., a clause) and each analysis fact (i.e., a tuple) as
a node in the Bayesian network. The edges of the network represent conditional
dependencies. A clause node is conditionally dependent on its “antecedent” tuple
nodes, and a tuple node is conditionally dependent on the clause nodes that “derive”
it. Every node is associated with a conditional probability distribution that quantifies
the incompleteness of the clause or tuple that the node represents. Since a Bayesian
network is acyclic by definition, such a straightforward manner of extracting a
Bayesian network from a derivation graph is possible only if the derivation graph is
4

acyclic. Therefore, we eliminate directed cycles from a derivation graph by deleting
clauses to break cycles, despite the fact that we may introduce more incompleteness
because of the loss of some derivation trees. But, cycle elimination is necessary for
us to get a handle on the problem.
In a Bayesian network constructed in this manner, alarm probabilities are the
posterior probabilities of the nodes representing the alarm tuples. Therefore, computing alarm probabilities reduces to performing marginal inference on the Bayesian
network. If the evidence of the ground truth of some alarms becomes available in
the future, we can recompute the posterior probabilities of the remaining alarms
conditioned on this evidence. With this approach, we obtain a probability for each
reported alarm that measures how likely it is that the alarm represents a real bug.
We then rank alarms by their inferred probabilities, in decreasing order. This ranking
places likely true alarms at the top, thereby enabling users to prioritize the triaging
of likely true alarms over false ones.
Our approach performs approximate marginal inference, using the loopy belief
propagation algorithm. We choose approximate inference because exact inference
is infeasible on large Bayesian networks that result from static analyses applied
to large and complex practical programs. In fact, the large sizes of the Bayesian
networks in practical settings pose a scalability problem even to approximate inference
algorithms. For this reason, our approach employs optimizations to reduce the size
of a derivation graph. These optimizations cause a corresponding reduction in the
size of the Bayesian network.
While our approach specifies a general way to augment program reasoning with
probabilistic reasoning, a specific instantiation of our approach needs to choose the
parameters of the Bayesian network. An instantiation of our approach needs to:
1. Define the conditional probability distribution (CPD) table at each node of the
Bayesian network. The CPD table at a node models the incompleteness of the
clause or tuple represented by that node.
5

2. Choose a cycle elimination algorithm and applicable optimizations. These
choices are made with a view to increasing the empirical effectiveness of alarm
ranking.

1.3.1

End-to-End Systems

We demonstrate the effectiveness and the generality of our approach by realizing it
in two practical end-to-end systems called Bingo [70] and Presto. Both Bingo
and Presto instantiate our general approach in different ways by making different
choices with respect to the following:
1. Defining the CPD tables of the Bayesian network in order to capture the sources
of incompleteness of the specific static analyses executed by the system.
2. Choosing the cycle elimination algorithm, and the optimizations applied to the
derivation graph to achieve empirical effectiveness of alarm ranking.
Bingo employs aggressive cycle elimination and two aggressive optimizations.
Bingo chooses aggressive cycle elimination in order to prune away large parts of
the extremely large derivation graphs produced by the static analyses executed by
Bingo, namely the datarace analysis and the taint analysis. One of the reasons
these analyses produce extremely large derivation graphs is because they perform
deductions at the granularity of individual program instructions. In addition, Bingo
employs aggressive optimizations to further reduce the size of the derivation graph.
Bingo defines the CPD tables associated with clause nodes to be probabilistic in
order to capture our hypothesis that incomplete analysis rules cause the datarace and
taint analyses to be incomplete. That is, for a clause node, Bingo specifies that its
consequent holds true with a probability that is strictly less than 1, even when all its
antecedents hold true. In addition, Bingo treats the analysis input facts as having a
probability of 1. The intuition underlying this hypothesis stems from the fact that
the datarace analysis is path-insensitive and the taint analysis is flow-insensitive.
6

Furthermore, Bingo leverages user feedback to compute and iteratively improve
the alarm ranking. It first computes an initial ranking of alarms. In an interactive
loop involving a user, Bingo seeks feedback about the ground truth of the topranked alarm. Next, it re-ranks alarms by recomputing the probabilities of all the
alarms conditioned on this feedback. In effect, this recomputation generalizes user
feedback, bringing correlated alarms closer to each other in the new ranking. Such
user interactions are repeated iteratively, causing true alarms to rise to the top of the
ranking. This process of iteratively improving the alarm ranking is a key factor in
the effectiveness of Bingo.
Presto employs a depth-first-search-based cycle elimination algorithm that
retains more derivation trees than the aggressive cycle elimination algorithm. Further,
Presto employs only one aggressive size-reducing optimization on the derivation
graph. Presto can afford to be less aggressive while eliminating cycles from the
derivation graph as compared to Bingo because the derivation graphs produced
by the static analysis executed by Presto, namely the exception flow analysis, are
much smaller as compared to, say, datarace derivation graphs. One of the reasons is
because the exception flow analysis, operates at the granularity of methods (performs
deductions on the nodes and edges of a call-graph). As a result of being less aggressive
during cycle elimination, Presto retains most of the derivation trees in a derivation
graph.
Presto defines the CPD tables associated with input tuples to be probabilistic,
and treats the deductive rules of the analysis as complete, in order to capture our
hypothesis that incomplete input tuples are the primary sources of false alarms in the
case of the exception flow analysis. A bug-finding static analysis, like the exception
flow analysis, is typically built atop one or more underlying analyses that produce
intermediate facts such as the call-graph and aliasing information. These intermediate
facts, which serve as inputs to the bug-finding analysis, are sometimes incomplete
because they are produced by analyses that make approximations. Therefore, Presto
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models the incompleteness of such input facts, in the CPD tables associated with
them, by specifying that an input fact holds true with a probability that is strictly
less than one.
In addition, Presto leverages the completeness of dynamic analysis to rank
alarms reported by a static analysis. Presto seeks to quantify the incompleteness
of each input fact by a probability estimate: it seeks this estimate from a dynamic
analysis that computes it by observing concrete program executions. Next, Presto
constructs a Bayesian network as described earlier. Marginal inference on the Bayesian
network propagates these probability estimates, and infers the posterior probabilities
associated with all the nodes of the network. Presto then ranks alarms by their
inferred probabilities.

1.3.2

Cycle Elimination

Finally, we examine the problem of cycle elimination, which arises in the context of
extracting a Bayesian network from a derivation graph. Because a Bayesian network
is acyclic by definition, we need to remove directed cycles from a derivation graph in
order to convert it into a Bayesian network in a straightforward manner. Eliminating
cycles in a derivation graph introduces more incompleteness into it because we may
lose some derivations of some analysis facts. In this dissertation, we present three
algorithms for cycle elimination, each of which is more precise than the previous
algorithm in the number of derivation trees it retains for each analysis fact.

1.4

Contributions and Organization

In summary, our contributions in this dissertation are as follows:
1. A general approach to augmenting program reasoning with probabilistic reasoning.
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2. Two end-to-end systems that realize and illustrate our approach.
3. A study of three approaches to cycle elimination in derivation graphs, a key
step in extracting a probabilistic model from the derivation steps of a static
analysis.
The rest of the material in this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2
covers background material, and Chapter 3 describes our approach to extending
program reasoning with probabilistic reasoning. Chapter 4 describes the two endto-end systems, Bingo and Presto, that rank alarms produced by client static
analyses: a datarace analysis, a taint analysis, and an exception flow analysis.
Chapter 5 explores different approaches to cycle elimination. Chapter 6 discusses
related work, Chapter 7 suggests directions in which this research can be continued,
and finally, Chapter 8 concludes.
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Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter, we cover the necessary background material on Datalog (Section 2.1)
and on Bayesian networks (Section 2.2).

2.1

Datalog Programs

In this section, we introduce the syntax and semantics of Datalog programs. A more
detailed treatment is in [4]. A Datalog program comprises a set of rules or constraints
of the form
Rh (uh ) :− R1 (u1 ), R2 (u2 ), . . . , Rp (up ).
Here, each Ri (ui ) is a relation representing a set of tuples with name Ri . The
relation Ri (ui ) has the form Ri (u1 , u2 , . . . , uk ) and arity k where u1 , u2 , . . . , uk are
free variables. The tuple Ri (vi ) = Ri (v1 , v2 , . . . , vk ) instantiates relation Ri (ui ) with
atoms v1 , v2 , . . . , vk drawn from appropriate domains whose union is the active domain
of constants. The set of all tuples Ri (vi ) is the extent of the relation Ri (ui ). A
relation whose extent is completely specified to us is called a relation of the extensional
database, or an EDB relation.
Each rule may be read as a universally quantified formula: “For all instantiations
v of the free variables from the active domain of constants, if R1 (v1 ), and R2 (v2 ),
10

. . . , and Rp (vp ), then Rh (vh )”. Instantiating a Datalog rule yields the Horn clause
R1 (v1 ) ∧ R2 (v2 ) ∧ · · · ∧ Rp (vp ) =⇒ Rh (vh ). An instantiated rule is also referred to
as a grounded constraint, or as a clause. Only one relation can occur to the left of
the :− sign in a Datalog rule and this relation is called the head or goal of the rule.
Zero or more relations can occur to the right of the :− sign and they form the body or
subgoals of the rule. Thus a rule specifies how to compute tuples of the head relation
from the tuples of relations in the body. The relations whose extents are computed
by Datalog rules are called the relations of the intensional database, or IDB relations.
The EDB (IDB) relations along with their extents form the EDB (IDB). One or more
of the IDB relations are designated to be the output relations. A Datalog program,
is therefore, a function from the EDB to the IDB.
Solving a Datalog program, entails the following actions. Given the extent I of
all EDB relations, we initialize the set of tuples, T := I, and initialize the grounded
constraints to the set of constraints that derive the input tuples, GC := {True =⇒
t | t ∈ I}. We repeatedly apply each rule to update T and GC until no new tuple
is derived. That is, whenever R1 (v1 ), R2 (v2 ), . . . , Rp (vp ) occur in T , we update
T := T ∪ {Rh (vh )}, and GC := GC ∪ {R1 (v1 ) ∧ R2 (v2 ) ∧ · · · ∧ Rp (vp ) =⇒ Rh (vh )}.
The set of tuples T is said to be the solution to the Datalog program. This solution
is said to have reached a fixpoint when the Datalog program applied to T , yields T .
A Datalog program is a monotone function that has a least fixpoint.

2.2

Bayesian Networks

We define and briefly explain a Bayesian network. A more detailed treatment is
in [40]. Let V be a set of random variables. For our purpose, it suffices to consider
only boolean-valued random variables. Let G = (V, E) be a directed acyclic graph
with its vertices as the set of random variables V . Let E be a set of directed edges.
Edges represent conditional dependencies. If there is no directed path from one node
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to another, then those two nodes represent random variables that are conditionally
independent of one another. Each random variable is associated with a probability
function called a conditional probability distribution (CPD) that is defined below.
For any v ∈ V , let Pa(v) be the set of variables with edges leading to v. Formally,
Pa(v) = {u ∈ V | u → v ∈ E}. The CPD of a random variable v is a function that
maps concrete valuations xPa(v) of Pa(v) to the conditional probability of the event
v = True, and we write this as p(v | xPa(v) ). The complementary event v = False
has conditional probability p(¬v | xPa(v) ) = 1 − p(v | xPa(v) ). The Bayesian network,
given by the triple BN = (V, G, p), is a compact representation of the following joint
probability distribution:
Pr(x) =

Y

p(xv | xPa(v) ),

(2.1)

v

where the joint assignment x is a valuation xv for each v ∈ V , and xPa(v) is the
valuation restricted to the parents of v. That is, a Bayesian network represents a family
of joint distributions that factorize as a product of local conditional probabilities.
From Equation 2.1, the following definitions can be derived: (a) the marginal
P
probability of a variable, Pr(v) = {x|xv =True} Pr(x), Pr(¬v) = 1 − Pr(v), and (b) the
conditional probability of arbitrary events: Pr(v | e) = Pr(v ∧ e)/ Pr(e).
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Chapter 3
Augmenting Program Reasoning
with Probabilistic Reasoning
In this dissertation, we work with static analyses that make deductive steps explicit
by specifying them in Datalog. But our approach is applicable to all static analyses
that employ techniques like abstract interpretation. This is because all such static
analyses apply, in effect, a series of deductive steps: at every program point, they
draw a conclusion based on the premises that hold at that program point.
The set of all deductive steps that have been executed by a static analysis specified
in Datalog, is captured as a Datalog derivation graph. We first describe this process
in Section 3.1. Then we go on to describe how a Bayesian network is constructed from
a derivation graph (Section 3.2). Next, we discuss marginal inference on a Bayesian
network (Section 3.3), and illustrate how alarm probabilities are conditioned on
evidence (Section 3.4). We end this section by discussing the configurable parameters
of our Bayesian network (Section 3.5).
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3.1

Static Analysis to Derivation Graph

In the scope of our study, a static analysis is a Datalog program. When a static
analysis specified in Datalog is applied to a program, the Datalog solver instantiates
the rules of the static analysis using EDB facts (i.e., tuples) that are extracted from
the program text. These rule instantiations produce new IDB facts (i.e., tuples) that
are used by the Datalog solver to instantiate more rules; this process continues until
no more new IDB facts are produced. At this point, we say that a fixpoint is reached.

3.1.1

Datalog Derivation Graph

The Datalog derivation graph G(T, GC) is induced by the set of tuples T and the
grounded constraints GC from the solution to a Datalog program, at fixpoint. The
set of vertices is T ∪ GC. There is an edge from a tuple t ∈ T to a clause g ∈ GC
whenever t is an antecedent of g, and an edge from g to t whenever t is the consequent
of g. We explain the structure of a derivation graph with an example. We show a
snippet of Java code in Figure 3.1, and the execution of a highly simplified static
datarace analysis specified in Figure 3.2, on the code snippet.
Consider the Java code in Figure 3.1. Assume that the methods close() and
getRequest() may be simultaneously invoked by multiple threads on the same
object. The synchronized block on lines L1–L3 ensures that for each object instance,
lines L4–L7 are executed at most once. Therefore there is no datarace between the pair
of accesses to controlSocket on lines L4 and L5, and between accesses on lines L5
and L5. There is also no datarace between the accesses to request on lines L6 and
L7, and between accesses on lines L7 and L7 by different threads. However, there is a

potential datarace between accesses to request on lines L0 and L7.
Figure 3.2 shows an extremely simplified static datarace analysis in Datalog
for Java programs, minimized from the one present in the Chord program analysis
framework [64]. The analysis takes the relations N(p1 , p2 ), U(p1 , p2 ), and A(p1 , p2 ) as
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2
3
4
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20
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class ReqHandler extends Thread {
private FtpRequest request;
private Socket controlSocket;
private boolean isConnectionClosed = false;
...
public FtpRequest getRequest() {
return request;
}
public void close() {
synchronized (this) {
if (isConnectionClosed) return;
isConnectionClosed = true;
}
controlSocket.close();
controlSocket = null;
request.clear();
request = null;
}

// L0

// L1
// L2
// L3
//
//
//
//

L4
L5
L6
L7

}

Figure 3.1: Example code fragment in Java.
input, and produces the relations P(p1 , p2 ) and race(p1 , p2 ) as output. In all these
relations, variables p1 , p2 and p3 range over the domain of program points. The input
relations contain tuples indicating some known facts about the program. For example,
for the program in Figure 3.1, N(p1 , p2 ) may contain the tuples N(L1, L2), N(L2, L3),
etc. Some input relations such as N(p1 , p2 ) are directly obtained by analyzing the
program text. Other input relations such as U(p1 , p2 ) or A(p1 , p2 ) are outputs of
earlier analyses (in this case, a lockset analysis and a pointer analysis, respectively).
The Datalog solver applies the analysis rules described in Figure 3.2, to the input
tuples until fixpoint.
The analysis rules should be understood as follows:
1. Rule r1 : For all program points p1 , p2 , p3 , if p1 and p2 may execute in parallel
(P(p1 , p2 )), and p3 may execute immediately after p2 (N(p2 , p3 )), and p1 and p3
are not guarded by a common lock (U(p1 , p3 )), then p1 and p3 may themselves
execute in parallel.
2. Rule r2 : For all program points p1 , p2 , if p1 and p2 may execute in parallel
15

Input relations
N(p1 , p2 ) :
U(p1 , p2 ) :
A(p1 , p2 ) :

Program point p2 may be executed immediately after program
point p1 by a thread.
Program points p1 and p2 are not guarded by a common lock.
Program points p1 and p2 may access the same memory location.

Output relations
P(p1 , p2 ) : Program points p1 and p2 may be executed by different threads in
parallel.
race(p1 , p2 ) : Program points p1 and p2 may have a datarace.
Analysis rules
r1 : P(p1 , p3 ) :− P(p1 , p2 ), N(p2 , p3 ), U(p1 , p3 ).
r2 : P(p2 , p1 ) :− P(p1 , p2 ).
r3 : race(p1 , p2 ) :− P(p1 , p2 ), A(p1 , p2 ).

Figure 3.2: A toy static datarace analysis in Datalog. The base rule for relation
P(p1 , p2 ) is elided for brevity.
(P(p1 , p2 )), then p2 and p1 may execute in parallel.
3. Rule r3 : For all program points p1 , p2 , if p1 and p2 may execute in parallel
(P(p1 , p2 )), and p1 and p2 may access the same memory location (A(p1 , p2 )),
then p1 and p2 may have a datarace.
A rule fires if and only if all its antecedent tuples are among the input tuples or have
been derived. On the other hand, a (consequent) tuple may be derived by more that
one rule. All instantiations of these rules together induce the derivation graph.
Figure 3.3 shows a snippet of the derivation graph when the rules above are applied
to the program snippet in Figure 3.1. A clause node is interpreted as conjunctive: a
clause is considered to have fired if and only if all its antecedent tuples have been
derived. Whereas, a tuple node is interpreted as disjunctive: a tuple is considered
derived if there is at least one clause deriving it. Also note that the two “alarm”
nodes race(L4, L5) and race(L6, L7) are correlated because they (transitively) depend
on the same analysis fact P(L4, L5). That is, the two alarms share the portion of the
derivation tree that derives fact P(L4, L5).
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P(L4, L2)

N(L2, L3)

U(L4, L3)

N(L3, L4)

U(L4, L4)

N(L4, L5)

U(L4, L5)

N(L5, L6)

U(L4, L6)

r1 (L4, L2, L3)
P(L4, L3)
r1 (L4, L3, L4)
P(L4, L4)
r1 (L4, L4, L5)
A(L4, L5)

P(L4, L5)
r3 (L4, L5)

r1 (L4, L5, L6)

race(L4, L5)

P(L4, L6)
r2 (L4, L6)

U(L6, L5)

N(L4, L5)

P(L6, L4)
r1 (L6, L4, L5)

U(L6, L6)

N(L5, L6)

P(L6, L5)
r1 (L6, L5, L6)

U(L6, L7)

N(L6, L7)

P(L6, L6)
r1 (L6, L6, L7)

A(L6, L7)

P(L6, L7)
r3 (L6, L7)
race(L6, L7)

Figure 3.3: A derivation graph snippet obtained by applying the datarace analysis in
Figure 3.2 to the program in Figure 3.1.
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3.1.2

Extracting the Derivation Graph

We extract the derivation graph by capturing all the rule instantiations at fixpoint.
To do this, we produce an instrumented Datalog program that contains the same
Datalog rules as the original program except that each rule is instrumented. The
goal of instrumenting each rule is to record all the variables that get projected out
while executing the rule. Executing the instrumented Datalog program will allow us
to reconstruct all rule instantiations at fixpoint. We illustrate this process with an
example rule. Consider rule r1 . When this rule executes to produce tuple P(p1 , p3 ),
the variable p2 is projected out. We record all the variables that have been projected
out by instrumenting the rules as follows:
ir1 : P_i1(p1 , p3 , p2 ) :− P(p1 , p2 ), N(p2 , p3 ), U(p1 , p3 ).
ir2 :
ir3 :

P_i2(p2 , p1 ) :− P(p1 , p2 ).
race_i1(p1 , p2 ) :− P(p1 , p2 ), A(p1 , p2 ).

When the instrumented analysis is executed, every tuple from the instrumented
relations P_i1(p1 , p3 , p2 ), P_i2(p2 , p1 ) and race_i1(p1 , p2 ) will give us the values of
the constants from which we can reconstruct a grounded constraint.
For example, assume we have the input tuples P(L6, L6), N(L6, L7), U(L6, L7) and
P(L7, L6). When the instrumented analysis executes, rule ir1 will fire and produce
tuple P_i1(L6, L7, L6). From this tuple, we can reconstruct the fact that rule r1 had
fired in the original analysis. Similarly, rule ir2 of the instrumented analysis will also
fire producing tuple P_i2(L6, L6). The presence of this tuple will tell us that rule r2 of
the original analysis had fired. Executing the instrumented analysis after the original
analysis has executed, will help extract the set of grounded constraints produced by
the execution of the original analysis. From this set of grounded constraints, we can
construct the derivation graph.
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3.2

Derivation Graph to Bayesian Network

The next step is to construct a Bayesian network from the derivation graph. We
have seen that a directed acyclic graph underlies a Bayesian network. The derivation
graph is a directed graph but it may contain cycles. The derivation graph needs to
be acyclic in order to extract a Bayesian network from it. Section 3.2.1 discusses
cycle elimination in derivation graphs, and Section 3.2.2 describes the construction
of the Bayesian network from the derivation graph. Finally, Section 3.2.3 discusses
two optimizations performed on the derivation graph in order to reduce the size of
the Bayesian network.

3.2.1

Cycle Elimination in Derivation Graphs

Figure 3.4 shows an example of a directed cycle in a derivation graph. We wish
to extract a Bayesian network from a derivation graph by representing every node
and edge in the derivation graph by a corresponding node and edge in the Bayesian
network. A Bayesian network is by definition acyclic. Therefore, in order to convert
a derivation graph into a Bayesian network in such a straightforward manner, we
need to eliminate directed cycles from the derivation graph. Cycle elimination will
introduce more incompleteness in the derivation of analysis facts, but it is a necessary
step for generating our probabilistic model.
The process of cycle elimination
r1 (L6, L6, L7)

r2 (L6, L7)

P(L6, L7)

r1 (L7, L5, L6)

chooses a subset of clauses GCc from the

P(L7, L6)

set of all clauses GC, such that GCc induces an acyclic derivation graph. Every

r2 (L7, L6)

tuple that is derivable in GC should still

Figure 3.4: An example of a cycle in the be derivable in GCc . Moreover, we want
derivation graph.
to retain as many correlations between
alarms (shared part of their derivation
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trees) as possible. Finding the largest such GCc is an NP-complete problem (by
reduction from the maximum acyclic subgraph problem [27]). We therefore relax the
condition that GCc must be the largest possible, and explore different approaches
to finding an acyclic subset of clauses GCc ⊆ GC. This is described in detail in
Chapter 5 where we propose three algorithms for cycle elimination, which differ in
the number of derivation trees they retain for tuples that are derived.

3.2.2

Acyclic Derivation Graph to Bayesian Network

We now convert GCc , the acyclic subset of all clauses, to a Bayesian network, by
following the guidelines below:
1. We represent each tuple and each clause by a node in the Bayesian network.
For every edge in the derivation graph, there is a corresponding edge in the
Bayesian network.
2. We quantify the incompleteness of each clause with a probability that represents the belief that the clause has an invalid conclusion despite having valid
hypotheses.
3. We quantify the incompleteness of each input tuple with a probability that
represents the likelihood of an input tuple not holding true.
4. We treat clause nodes as conjunctive nodes: that is, a clause could fire only if
all its antecedent tuples are derived. We treat tuple nodes as disjunctive nodes:
that is, a tuple could be derived by one or more clauses.
We apply these guidelines to an example clause and tuples. Rule r1 in Figure 3.2
is incomplete. To see this, consider the following example. Even though the analysis
facts P(L4, L2), N(L2, L3) and U(L4, L3) are all true, we know that fact P(L4, L3) is
not true because if one thread executes line L4, other threads will return at line L2 as
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explained earlier. We quantify the incompleteness of rules by associating a probability
with clause nodes as follows:
Pr(r1 (L4, L2, L3) | h1 ) = 0.95, and
Pr(¬r1 (L4, L2, L3) | h1 ) = 1 − 0.95 = 0.05,

(3.1)
(3.2)

where h1 = P(L4, L2) ∧ N(L2, L3) ∧ U(L4, L3) is the event indicating that all the
hypotheses of r1 (L4, L2, L3) are true, and 0.95 is the probability of the clause “firing”.
By setting the probability to a value strictly less than 1, we make it possible for the
clause r1 (L4, L2, L3) to have not “fired”, even though all the hypotheses indicated by
event h1 are true.
If any of the antecedents of r1 (L4, L2, L3) is false, then it is itself definitely false:
Pr(r1 (L4, L2, L3) | ¬h1 ) = 0, and
Pr(¬r1 (L4, L2, L3) | ¬h1 ) = 1.

(3.3)
(3.4)

Input tuples can also be incomplete because input tuples like A(L6, L7) are
produced by other program analyses that are themselves incomplete. Therefore,
we associate a probability with input nodes as follows:
Pr(A(L6, L7)) = 0.95, and
Pr(¬ A(L6, L7)) = 1 − 0.95 = 0.05.

(3.5)
(3.6)

Certain input tuples, for example N(L6, L7), that are extracted directly from the
program text, may be treated as known with certainty. In this case, the probability
we associate with such input nodes is as follows:
Pr(N(L6, L7)) = 1.0, and
Pr(¬ N(L6, L7)) = 0.0.
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(3.7)
(3.8)

We treat nodes representing derived tuples as disjunctions:
Pr(P(L6, L7) | r1 (L6, L6, L7) ∨ r2 (L7, L6)) = 1, and
Pr(P(L6, L7) | ¬(r1 (L6, L6, L7) ∨ r2 (L7, L6))) = 0.

(3.9)
(3.10)

The probability value of 0.95 that we have used above is only for illustration. In
general, the Bayesian network is parameterized by a vector of probabilities p that
maps (a) each rule r to its rule firing probability that quantifies completeness of the
rule, and/or (b) each instantiated input tuple t to a probability that quantifies its
completeness. We discuss how to get the initial rule probabilities in Section 4.1.1. For
an EDB relation that is treated probabilistically, Section 4.3 illustrates one approach
to get the probabilities for individual tuples of the EDB relation. We associate
conditional probability distributions (CPDs) with all nodes of the Bayesian network
that has been constructed from the derivation graph induced by GCc . Figure 3.5 shows
a small snippet of the derivation graph that contains EDB tuple nodes, clause nodes
that are interpreted as conjunctive nodes, and IDB tuple nodes that are interpreted
as disjunctive nodes. Figure 3.6 shows the Bayesian network that corresponds to this
snippet, with CPDs for representative nodes. Note that the size of the CPD for a
node is exponential in the number of nodes on which it is conditionally dependent.

P(L6, L6)

N(L6, L7)

U(L6, L7)

r1 (L6, L6, L7)

P(L7, L6)
r2 (L7, L6)

P(L6, L7)

Figure 3.5: A derivation graph snippet showing a conjunctive node (r1 (L6, L6, L7))
and a disjunctive node (P(L6, L7)).
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Figure 3.6: The Bayesian network for the derivation graph snippet of Figure 3.5,
with CPDs for EDB tuple nodes N(L6, L7) and U(L6, L7), conjunctive clause nodes
r1 (L6, L6, L7) and r2 (L7, L6), and the disjunctive tuple node P(L6, L7).

3.2.3

Optimizations

The time taken for marginal inference on a Bayesian network depends on the size of
the Bayesian network and on the sizes of the CPDs at each node of the network. This
section discusses two optimizations that reduce the size of the Bayesian network.
Coreachability based constraint pruning. The derivation graph at fixpoint
contains all derivable tuples. Not all derivable tuples in the derivation graph participate in deriving the alarm tuples. Therefore, this optimization removes unnecessary
tuples and clauses by performing a backward pass over the set of clauses GC. We
initialize the set of useful tuples U := O, where O is the set of alarm tuples, and
repeatedly perform the following update until fixpoint:
U := U ∪ {t | ∃g ∈ GC s.t. t ∈ Ag and cg ∈ U }.
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Here, cg is the consequent of clause g, and Ag is the set of all antecedents of g.
Informally, a tuple is useful if it is either itself an alarm, or can be used to produce a
useful tuple. The final pruned set of clauses is defined as follows: GC 0 = {g ∈ GC |
cg ∈ U }.
Chain compression. This optimization compresses a chain of derivation steps to
a single derivation step. Consider the derivation graph shown in Figure 3.3, and
observe the sequence of tuples P(L4, L2) → P(L4, L3) → P(L4, L4) → P(L4, L5). Both
intermediate tuples P(L4, L3) and P(L4, L4) are produced by exactly one grounded
constraint, and are consumed as an antecedent by exactly one clause. Furthermore,
we will never need the probabilities of these tuples for ranking as neither of them is
an alarm node. We may therefore rewrite the derivation graph to directly conclude
that P(L4, L2) → P(L4, L5). We formally present this optimization in Algorithm 1.

3.3

Marginal Inference

There are several methods to perform marginal inference in Bayesian networks. Techniques for exact inference are variable elimination, the junction tree algorithm [37],
and symbolic techniques [28]. All these algorithms have a complexity that is exponential in the Bayesian network’s tree width [49]. Techniques for approximate
inference are loopy belief propagation [44, 59], sampling methods such as Gibbs
sampling (a MCMC sampling algorithm), or variational methods. We choose loopy
belief propagation because we need a deterministic inference technique that scales to
large networks.
Belief propagation is a message-passing algorithm for performing inference on
graphical models like Bayesian networks and Markov random fields. It is an exact
inference algorithm on probabilistic models that have a tree structure. However, it
was found that the belief propagation could be used as an approximate inference
technique on general graphical models. When used as an approximate inference
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Algorithm 1 Compress(GC, C, O), where GC is the set of grounded constraints,
C is the set of derived tuples, and O is the set of alarms produced by the analysis. It
returns the modified set of clauses GC.
1. For each tuple t, define:
Srcs(t) := {g ∈ GC | t = cg },
Sinks(t) := {g ∈ GC | t ∈ Ag }.
2. Construct the following set:
E := {t ∈ C \ O | | Srcs(t)| = 1 ∧ | Sinks(t)| = 1}.
3. While E is not empty:
(a) Pick an arbitrary tuple t ∈ E, and let Srcs(t) = {g1 }, and Sinks(t) = {g2 }.
(b) Since t = cg1 and t is an antecedent of g2 , let
g1 = a1 ∧ a2 ∧ · · · ∧ ak =⇒ t, and
g2 = t ∧ b1 ∧ b2 ∧ . . . bp =⇒ t0 .
(c) Define a new clause, g 0 = a1 ∧ a2 ∧ · · · ∧ ak ∧ b1 ∧ b2 ∧ · · · ∧ bp =⇒ t0 . Update
GC := GC ∪ {g 0 } \ {g1 , g2 }, E := E \ {t}, and recompute Srcs and Sinks.
(d) If g1 was associated with rule r1 with probability p1 , and g2 was associated
with rule r2 with probability p2 , then associate g 0 with a new rule r0 with
probability p1 p2 .
4. Return GC.

technique, it is called loopy belief propagation. Empirical studies show that it often
converges to values that are very close to the true marginal probabilities [61]. In each
round of the inference algorithm, each random variable v passes a message to all its
neighbors u (both parents and children), indicating the updated belief in u given the
current belief in v. Each node then computes a new belief by combining the messages
received from all its neighbors. The algorithm terminates when the beliefs converge
to within a factor of  across two subsequent iterations. In our experiments, we
use the loopy belief propagation algorithm implemented by LibDAI, an off-the-shelf
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inference engine [59]. In situations where loopy belief propagation sometimes does
not converge, we halt the loop by setting a limit on the number of iterations that it
can execute. In such cases, we return the average belief over the last 100 iterations
to suppress oscillatory behavior.

3.4

Conditioning on Evidence

In this section, we illustrate how alarm probability and hence alarm ranking changes
when the probabilities are conditioned on evidence. Consider the alarm probabilities
and ranking in Table 3.1a. This table is ranking the alarms reported for the example
code in Figure 3.1. Among the five reported alarms, alarm race(L0, L7) is a true alarm
and the rest are false alarms. But the true alarm is ranked the last. Suppose we
acquire evidence that the top-ranked alarm race(L4, L5) is a false alarm. We can now
recompute the alarm probabilities of all the alarms conditioned on this fact. This
results in the updated list of alarms shown in Table 3.1b. Observe that the belief
in the closely related alarm race(L6, L7) drops from 0.324 to 0.030. Similarly, the
belief in the other two closely related alarms, race(L5, L5) and race(L7, L7), also drop.
Whereas, the belief in the unrelated alarm race(L0, L7) remains unchanged at 0.279.
As a result, the entire family of false alarms drops in the ranking, so that the only
true alarm is now at the top.
In general, if e is the observed evidence that takes the form of an event like “tuple
t0 = 1” or “tuple t0 = 0”, then, recomputing alarm probabilities entails replacing the
prior belief Pr(t) for each tuple t, with the posterior belief, Pr(t | e). It is possible
that the observed evidence could be a more complex event, for example, a conjunction
of more than one observed tuple bound to its observed value. LibDAI, the library
that we use to perform marginal inference allows us observe the values of nodes prior
to performing loopy belief propagation, thus conditioning the computed probabilities
on the observed evidence.
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Table 3.1: Alarm ranking by probabilities, (a) before, and (b) after the evidence
¬ race(L4, L5). The real datarace race(L0, L7) rises in the ranking after conditioning
on evidence.
(a) Pr(a).
Rank

Belief

1
2
3
4
5

0.398
0.378
0.324
0.308
0.279

Program points
ReqHandler
ReqHandler
ReqHandler
ReqHandler
ReqHandler

:
:
:
:
:

L4,
L5,
L6,
L7,
L0,

ReqHandler
ReqHandler
ReqHandler
ReqHandler
ReqHandler

:
:
:
:
:

L5
L5
L7
L7
L7

:
:
:
:
:

L7
L5
L7
L7
L5

(b) Pr(a | ¬ race(L4, L5)).

3.5

Rank

Belief

1
2
3
4
5

0.279
0.035
0.030
0.028
0

Program points
ReqHandler
ReqHandler
ReqHandler
ReqHandler
ReqHandler

:
:
:
:
:

L0,
L5,
L6,
L7,
L4,

ReqHandler
ReqHandler
ReqHandler
ReqHandler
ReqHandler

Configurations of the Bayesian Network

The Bayesian network that we extract from the derivation graph is a flexible probabilistic model that encodes relationships between analysis facts. When we implement
an alarm ranking system with an underlying Bayesian network, there are several
design choices that we can make to customize the Bayesian network to be empirically
effective.
Choosing a cycle elimination algorithm. One configurable parameter is the
choice of a cycle elimination algorithm that eliminates cycles in a derivation graph
before it is converted to a Bayesian network. Chapter 5 discusses three approaches
for cycle elimination. The approaches differ in how aggressively they discard clauses
from the derivation graph, in order to eliminate cycles. While all tuples still remain
derivable in all the approaches, we may lose correlations between alarms to different
extents. This is because we may lose one or more derivation trees for a tuple when
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a clause is discarded. Therefore cycle elimination reduces the size of the derivation
graph, but increases incompleteness and may destroy some alarm correlations. The
size of the Bayesian network, which is directly proportional to that of the derivation
graph, greatly impacts the time taken for the convergence of approximate marginal
inference, and also how often there is convergence versus timeout. Therefore, we need
to employ a cycle elimination algorithm that discards the least number of clauses
while ensuring the scalability of inference over the resulting Bayesian network.
Choosing optimizations. Another configurable parameter is whether or not to
apply chain compression to derivation graphs. Chain compression is an optimization
(discussed in Section 3.2.3) to reduce the size of the derivation graph from which a
Bayesian network is constructed. Chain compression does not alter alarm probabilities
only when exact inference is performed on the resulting Bayesian network. That
is, exact marginal inference on Bayesian networks constructed from the compressed
and uncompressed derivation graphs will produce the same probability distribution
for alarms. But approximate marginal inference will not. In our setting, Bayesian
networks are large and exact inference is infeasible. While chain compression helps
to reduce the size of the Bayesian network, approximate inference on optimized
and unoptimized Bayesian networks converge to different probability distributions
for alarms. On an orthogonal note, chain compression may or may not effectively
reduce the size of the derivation graph, depending on the form of the instantiated
clauses. Chain compression is highly effective when there are long chains of derivation
sequences involving clauses with single antecedents. Therefore, the decision of whether
or not to apply chain compression is a configurable parameter.
Choosing causes of analysis incompleteness. As discussed in Section 3.2.2, we
can define the CPD at each node of the Bayesian network. While doing so, we can
treat each node as either complete by assigning a probability of 1.0, or as incomplete
by assigning a probability strictly less than 1.0. In our implementation of the system
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Bingo (Section 4.1), we have chosen to treat input tuples as complete and the
deduction rules as incomplete. This is because of our belief that the false alarms
stem primarily from the incompleteness of deduction rules, and not the input tuples,
of the client static analyses of Bingo. The reason for this belief is that the one of the
client static analyses of Bingo (datarace analysis) is path-insensitive, and the other
(taint analysis) is flow-insensitive. In the implementation of the system Presto
(Section 4.3), we treat (a) input tuples of the client analysis that are produced by
underlying static analyses as incomplete, (b) input tuples that are extracted from
program text as complete, and (c) deduction rules as complete. In the client static
analysis of Presto, incomplete input tuples are the primary sources of false alarms
and not the deduction rules. Presto’s client analysis is an exception flow analysis
that reports exception objects escaping via the main method, as alarms. One of
the input relations it uses to compute exception flows is the call-graph edge. The
call-graph edge is an output relation generated by a flow- and context-insensitive
interprocedural pointer analysis that is executed before the exception flow analysis.
If a call-graph edge is unrealizable, entire exception flows that involve this call-graph
edge are unrealizable. Thus, an incomplete input tuple (a call-graph edge) causes the
analysis to deduce an unrealizable exception flow and report a false alarm.
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Chapter 4
The Alarm Ranking System
The alarm ranking system is an end-to-end system that performs the following tasks
in order: (a) executes the static analysis on a program, (b) extracts the derivation
graph at fixpoint, (c) constructs a Bayesian network from the derivation graph,
(d) performs marginal inference on the Bayesian network, (e) produces a ranked list
of alarms, and (f) (optionally) improves the alarm ranking by conditioning it on
evidence. We have implemented two instances of the alarm ranking system: Bingo
and Presto. We describe Bingo in Section 4.1, and its evaluation in Section 4.2.
Next, we describe Presto in Section 4.3, and its evaluation in Section 4.4. Lastly,
in Section 4.5, we analyze the ranking methodology.

4.1

End-to-End System: Bingo

The system Bingo is an alarm ranking system as described above. Its effectiveness lies
in leveraging user feedback to iteratively improve the alarm ranking by conditioning
the alarm probabilities on the user feedback accrued thus far. In each iteration, Bingo
presents the alarm with highest probability for inspection by the user. The user then
indicates its ground truth, and Bingo incorporates this feedback as evidence for
subsequent iterations. We summarize this process in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: The Bingo workflow and interaction model.

In Bingo, we parameterize the Bayesian network with a vector of rule probabilities
p. We uniformly initialize each rule with a probability of 0.999. Ideally, we can learn
these initial probabilities from labelled data. Indeed, the Bingo workflow shows a
probability learning module that incorporates the learning of rule probabilities in the
workflow. If we had fully labelled data (i.e., if we knew whether the consequent tuple
produced by every instance of every rule, was complete or not), the rule probability
is simply the fraction of rule instances producing the complete consequent. However,
typical labelled data only comprises labelled alarms. That is, we will usually not
have labels for all consequent tuples produces by all rule instances: they are latent
or unobserved. In such situations, we could learn the rule probabilities as described
in Section 4.1.1. However, this technique requires a large corpus, and a proper
experimental evaluation involves partitioning the data into training and test sets. To
avoid this problem, Bingo opts to parameterize the Bayesian network by assigning a
uniform constant probability to each rule.
We formally describe the workflow of Bingo in Algorithm 2. For cycle elimination
in step 3, Bingo uses the aggressive algorithm in Section 5.2 because it needs to
scale to large programs (≈ 1–10 million grounded constraints). Step 4 performs both
the coreachability and the chain compression optimizations discussed in Section 3.2.3.
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Algorithm 2 Bingo(D, P, p), where D is the analysis expressed in Datalog, P is
the program to be analyzed, and p maps each analysis rule r to its firing probability
pr .
1. Let I = InputRelationsD (P ). Populate all input relations I using the program
text and prior analysis results.
2. Let (C, O, GC) = DatalogSolve(D, I). C is the set of derived tuples, O ⊆ C is
the set of alarms produced, and GC is the set of grounded constraints.
3. Compute GCc := CycleElimAggressive(I, C, GC). Eliminate cycles from the
grounded constraints.
4. (Optionally,) Update GCc := Optimize(I, GCc , O). Reduce the size of the set of
grounded constraints.
5. Construct Bayesian network BN from GCc and p, and let Pr be its joint probability
distribution.
6. Initialize the feedback set e := ∅.
7. While there exists an unlabelled alarm:
(a) Let Ou = O \ e be the set of all unlabelled alarms.
(b) Determine the top-ranked unlabelled alarm:
ot = arg max Pr(o | e).
o∈Ou

(c) Present ot for inspection. If the user labels it a true alarm, update e := e∪{ot }.
Otherwise, update e := e ∪ {¬ot }.

Bingo uses an off-the-shelf solver [59] for the conditional probability queries in
step 7(b).
We have used Bingo to rank alarms reported by two static analyses: datarace
and taint analysis. We briefly describe these analyses in Section 4.1.2.
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4.1.1

Getting Initial Probabilities

We describe one approach to learning good initial probabilities that quantify the
incompleteness of analysis rules. Given a program and its associated ground truth
v, the learning problem is to determine the most likely probability vector p that
explains v. The likelihood, L(p; v) is the probability of v under the probability vector
p. That is, L(p; v) = Prp (v). We need to estimate the probability vector that will
maximize this likelihood.
p̃ = arg max L(p; v).
p

(4.1)

In our setting, this estimation may be performed by the Expectation Maximization
algorithm [40].

4.1.2

Client Analyses

The end-to-end system Bingo demonstrates our approach of augmenting program
reasoning with probabilistic reasoning on two bug-finding static analyses written in
Datalog: datarace analysis and taint analysis.
Datarace Analysis
The datarace analysis [64] finds pairs of program points that access a heap object
(read/write), and that could potentially be executed in parallel by two different
threads, with at least one of the accesses being a write access. The analysis is
implemented in the Chord framework [63] and is built on top of the following:
1. A flow- and context-sensitive may-happen-in-parallel analysis that tracks program points that may be executed by pairs of threads potentially running in
parallel.
2. A context-sensitive thread-escape analysis that computes the set of program
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points potentially reading or writing to heap objects that may not be threadlocal. A heap object in a multithreaded shared-memory program is thread-local
when it is reachable only from at most a single thread. Only program points
that access thread-escaping (non-thread-local) heap objects may potentially
make a racy access to a heap object. The thread-escape analysis is guided
by a technique [82] that efficiently searches a large family of abstractions to
prove a query of the form: Does a specific program point read from or write to
a heap object that is not thread-local? This technique either: (a) finds the
cheapest heap abstraction that proves such a query, or (b) shows that no such
abstraction exists. Therefore this technique helps the thread-escape analysis to
eliminate program points that may access (read/write) heap objects that are
definitely thread-local.
3. A pointer analysis [56] that is 3-context-and-object sensitive but flow-insensitive.
This analysis is soundy [53], i.e., sound except for some features of Java,
including exceptions and reflection (which is resolved by a dynamic analysis
[13] - unsound but complete). The datarace analysis, may-happen-in-parallel
analysis, and the thread-escape analysis use either or both the call-graph and
the points-to information computed by the pointer analysis.
Typically, static analyses make unsound choices [53] so that they are scalable and
practically useful. For example, the Chord [64] static analysis framework does not
model exceptions in Java. In addition, the datarace analysis provides three unsound
switches that introduce different degrees of unsoundness, in order to limit the number
of reported alarms:
1. A switch to turn on a lock-set analysis that determines the set of locks that
may guard each program point. The datarace analysis uses this as “must”
information and unsoundly excludes all pairs of accesses that may be guarded
by the same lock, from the set of pairs of potentially racing accesses.
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2. A switch to exclude dataraces between two accesses in the same abstract thread.
This exclusion is sound if one abstract thread corresponds to exactly one
concrete thread. But this may not always be the case. The datarace analysis
models each thread starting at a given program point as one abstract thread.
If a program point that starts a thread is in the body of a loop, each distinct
concrete thread that may be started in an iteration of the loop will be modeled
by the same abstract thread. In such a scenario, excluding dataraces between
accesses in the same abstract thread is unsound.
3. A switch to exclude dataraces in which at least one of the accesses is in a
constructor. It is sound to exclude dataraces on the “this” object in constructors.
But, it is unsound to exclude every datarace in which one of the racing accesses
may happen within the body of a constructor.
While turning on these unsound switches reduces the total number of reported alarms,
and the number of false positives, it does introduce false negatives.
The datarace analysis together with all its underlying analyses, comprises 102 rules
and 102 relations. Bingo executes the datarace analysis in its soundest configuration
by turning off the unsound switches, in order to avoid false negatives. It instruments
the rules of the datarace analysis, thread-escape analysis and the may-happen-inparallel analysis to extract the derivation graph that captures the reasoning steps
employed by these analyses while deducing a datarace bug.
Taint Analysis
The taint analysis [24] computes data flows in Android programs, whose sources are
Android framework methods that read sensitive data, and whose sinks are framework
methods that leak sensitive data outside the device. The analysis tracks the flow of
complex sensitive data captured in heap objects, and also tracks the flow of scalar
data (e.g. integer values) assigned to static/instance fields and local variables. It
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is implemented in the Soot framework [78]. The taint analysis is built on top of a
context-insensitive pointer analysis that is similar to the one used in the datarace
analysis [56] except for context-sensitivity. The call-graph and points-to information
generated by the pointer analysis is used by the taint analysis.
The sources of sensitive data and the points of leak (sinks) are marked by two
types of annotations called the source and the sink annotations. These annotations
are placed on program variables. The taint analysis in the Android framework comes
with built-in source and sink annotations that were written manually by the analysis
writer. The analysis propagates these annotations through the Android program
in order to determine the flow of sensitive data to points of leak. The propagation
rules associate each abstract heap object, scalar static/instance field, and scalar local
variable with a (a) source annotation if it could contain the sensitive data generated
at a source represented by the annotation, and, (b) sink annotation if the data it
contains could flow to the point of leak represented by the annotation. In addition
to these annotations, there are also transfer annotations for propagating the flow of
source and sink annotations through the methods of the Android framework, that
are used in lieu of analyzing the methods of the Android framework. This enables
the taint analysis to analyze the source code of only the Android application and
completely avoid analyzing the methods of the Android framework.
The taint analysis propagates source annotations on scalar variables by performing
a forward inter-procedural dataflow analysis, and on heap objects using points-to
sets. It propagates the sink annotations by performing a backward inter-procedural
method-escape analysis. While performing both these analyses, the taint analysis
uses the heap points-to information (pre-computed by pointer analysis) to transitively
annotate all objects nested within an already-annotated object. The taint analysis
concludes that there is a tainted data flow from an annotated source to an annotated
sink if there is some abstract heap object, or some local/static/instance scalar variable
that is associated with both the source annotation and the sink annotation.
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The taint analysis together with all its underlying analyses, comprise 62 rules
and 77 relations. Bingo instruments the rules of the taint analysis to extract the
derivation graph that captures the reasoning steps employed by the taint analysis
while deducing a tainted data flow.

4.2

Bingo: Experimental Evaluation

In this section, we describe the evaluation of Bingo. We start by giving details about
the benchmarks used for the evaluation ((Section 4.2.1) and the reference baselines
against which we perform the measurements ((Section 4.2.2).
For the evaluation, we primarily measured two things: (a) effectiveness: how
effective is Bingo in ranking alarms (Section 4.2.3), and (b) robustness: how robust
is the ranking produced by Bingo, to incorrect responses (Section 4.2.4). In addition
to the above, we investigated if Bingo helped in discovering new bugs missed by
existing precise analysis tools (Section 4.2.5), and to what extent the optimizations
of Bingo helped to scale its applicability to large programs (Section 4.2.6).

4.2.1

Benchmarks

We evaluated Bingo on the suite of 16 benchmarks shown in Table 4.1. Eight of
these are benchmarks to which we applied the datarace analysis, and the remaining
eight are benchmarks to which we applied the taint analysis. The first four datarace
benchmarks are commonly used in previous work [23, 81]. The remaining four are
from the DaCapo benchmark suite [10]. We obtained the ground truth by manual
inspection. The eight taint analysis benchmarks were chosen from the STAMP [24]
repository, and are a combination of apps provided by a major security company,
and challenge problems used in past research. Table 4.2 gives various metrics that
indicate the size of the benchmarks.
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Taint analysis

Datarace analysis

Table 4.1: Benchmark description.
Program
hedc
ftp
weblech
jspider
avrora
luindex
sunflow
xalan
app-324
nsounds
app-ca7
app-kQm
tmazes
atrail
gmaster
app-018

Description
Web crawler from ETH
Apache FTP server
Website download/mirror tool
Web spider engine
AVR microcontroller simulator
Document indexing tool
Photo-realistic image rendering system
XML to HTML transforming tool
Unendorsed Adobe Flash player (leaks phone number and SMS content)
Music player (leaks location information)
Simulation game (leaks phone number)
Puzzle game (leaks phone number)
Puzzle game (packages the Mobishooter malware)
RPG game (contains malicious behaviors: SD-card overwrite and delete SMS)
Image processing tool (packages the gingermaster malware on Android 2.3)
Arcade game (leaks IMEI and IMSI information)

Table 4.2: Benchmark characteristics. ‘Total’ and ‘App’ columns are numbers using
0-CFA call graph construction, with and without the JDK for datarace analysis
benchmarks, and with and without the Android framework for taint analysis benchmarks.

Taint analysis

Datarace analysis

Program
hedc
ftp
weblech
jspider
avrora
luindex
sunflow
xalan
app-324
nsounds
app-ca7
app-kQm
tmazes
atrail
gmaster
app-018

# Classes
Total App
357
44
499
119
579
56
362
113
2,080 1,119
1,168
169
1,857
127
1,727
390
1,788
81
1,418
119
1,470
142
1,332
105
2,462
547
1,623
339
1,474
159
1,840
275

# Methods
Total
App
2,154
230
2,754
608
3,344
303
1,584
426
10,095 3,875
7,494 1,030
12,934
967
12,214 3,007
6,518
167
4,323
500
4,928
889
4,114
517
7,034 2,815
5,016 1,523
4,500
738
5,397 1,389
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Bytecode (KLOC)
Total
App
141
11
152
23
167
12
95
13
369
113
317
47
616
53
520
120
40
10
52
11
55
23
68
31
77
35
81
44
82
39
98
50

4.2.2

Baselines

We compare Bingo to two baseline algorithms, BaseR and BaseC. In each iteration,
BaseR chooses an alarm for inspection uniformly at random from the pool of
unlabelled alarms. The algorithm BaseC is based on the alarm classifier Eugene [55].
Eugene classifies alarms as true or false based on available feedback on a subset
of alarms. In each iteration, (a) we invoke Eugene to classify the current set of
unlabelled alarms, and (b) we pick a true alarm (as classified by Eugene) at random,
for inspection and labelling by a user. When BaseC exhausts all alarms classified as
true by Eugene, it picks an alarm classified as false, at random, and proposes it for
inspection.
A more formal description of algorithm BaseC is given below: Let A be the set
of alarms produced by the analysis. Eugene generalizes feedback on some disjoint
subsets of alarms, Lp , Ln ⊆ A, and classifies all a ∈ A as likely true and likely
false: Ap , An , such that Ap ∪ An = A, Lp ⊆ Ap , and Ln ⊆ An . We constructed the
user-guided alarm-ranking algorithm BaseC, from Eugene, as follows:
1. Initialize Lp and Ln to ∅.
2. While there exists an unlabelled alarm:
(a) Invoke the classifier: (Ap , An ) = Classify(Lp , Ln ).
(b) Pick an unlabelled alarm a uniformly at random from Ap . If no such alarm
exists, choose it uniformly at random from An .
(c) Present a for inspection by the user, and insert it into Lp or Ln as
appropriate.

4.2.3

Measuring Effectiveness

We measure the effectiveness of Bingo by the following three metrics explained
below:
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1. The rank at which the last true alarm is discovered (Rank-100%-T).
2. The rank at which 90% of the true alarms are discovered (Rank-90%-T). We
measure this because the last true alarm to be discovered may be an outlier
and therefore, may not be a conclusive indicator of the effectiveness of Bingo.
3. The area under the ROC curve (AUC). The ROC curve for a benchmark
captures the dynamical behavior of the interaction process. In other words, it
captures how early on in the interactive process, all true alarms are discovered.
The ROC curve for a benchmark, is a graph that represents the number of false
alarms on the x-axis and the number of true alarms on the y-axis, as observed
at any point in the interaction process. Each point (x, y) on the ROC curve
indicates a step in the interaction process where the user has inspected x false
alarms and y true alarms. At each step, if the next inspected alarm is true,
the next point on the ROC curve is (x, y + 1). If the next inspected alarm is
false, the next point on the ROC curve is (x + 1, y). AUC is the (normalized)
area under the ROC curve. Intuitively, the farther away the curve is above the
diagonal, earlier the true alarms seen in the interaction process. That is, larger
the AUC, earlier the true alarms seen in the interaction process. Therefore the
AUC is a succinct metric that measures the goodness of a ranking.
We present our measurements of all the three metrics for Bingo and the two
baselines, in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. For instance, the datarace analysis produces 522
alarms on ftp, of which 75 are real dataraces. Bingo presents all true alarms for
inspection within just 103 rounds of interaction, compared to 368 for BaseC, and
520 for BaseR. Another notable example is luindex from the DaCapo suite, on
which the analysis produces 940 alarms. Of these alarms, only 2 are real dataraces,
and Bingo reports both bugs within just 14 rounds of interaction, compared to 101
for BaseC and 587 for BaseR. Over all benchmarks, on average, a user needs to
inspect 44.2% and 58.5% fewer alarms than BaseC and BaseR respectively.
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Table 4.3: Summary of metrics for the effectiveness of Bingo. Rank-100%-T and
Rank-90%-T are the ranks at which all and 90% of the true alarms have been
inspected, respectively. For the baselines, we show the median measurement across
five runs. TO stands for timeout.

Taint analysis

Datarace analysis

Program
Total
152
522
30
257
978
940
958
1,870
110
212
393
817
352
156
437
420

hedc
ftp
weblech
jspider
avrora
luindex
sunflow
xalan
app-324
nsounds
app-ca7
app-kQm
tmazes
atrail
gmaster
app-018

#Alarms
Bugs
%TP
12
7.89%
75 14.37%
6 20.00%
9
3.50%
29
2.97%
2
0.21%
171 17.85%
75
4.01%
15 13.64%
52 24.53%
157 39.95%
160 19.58%
150 42.61%
7
4.49%
87 19.91%
46 10.95%

Rank-100%-T
Bingo BaseC BaseR
67
121
143
103
368
520
11
16
29
20
128
247
410
971
960
14
101
587
838
TO
952
273
TO
1844
51
104
106
135
159
207
206
277
391
255
386
815
221
305
351
14
48
117
267
303
436
288
311
412

Rank-90%-T
Bingo BaseC BaseR
65
115
135
80
290
476
10
15
25
19
101
201
365
798
835
14
101
587
483
TO
872
266
TO
1,706
44
89
97
79
132
190
172
212
350
200
297
717
155
205
318
13
44
92
150
214
401
146
186
369

Table 4.4: Summary of metrics for the effectiveness of Bingo - continued. For the
baselines, we show the median measurement across five runs. TO stands for timeout.

Taint analysis

Datarace analysis

Program
hedc
ftp
weblech
jspider
avrora
luindex
sunflow
xalan
app-324
nsounds
app-ca7
app-kQm
tmazes
atrail
gmaster
app-018

Total
152
522
30
257
978
940
958
1,870
110
212
393
817
352
156
437
420

#Alarms
Bugs
%TP
12
7.89%
75 14.37%
6 20.00%
9
3.50%
29
2.97%
2
0.21%
171 17.85%
75
4.01%
15 13.64%
52 24.53%
157 39.95%
160 19.58%
150 42.61%
7
4.49%
87 19.91%
46 10.95%
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Area under the curve (AUC)
Bingo BaseC
BaseR
0.81
0.76
0.50
0.98
0.78
0.49
0.84
0.78
0.48
0.97
0.81
0.59
0.75
0.70
0.51
0.99
0.89
0.61
0.79
TO
0.50
0.91
TO
0.50
0.83
0.58
0.50
0.89
0.69
0.50
0.96
0.81
0.51
0.93
0.86
0.51
0.95
0.79
0.50
0.98
0.81
0.60
0.84
0.77
0.47
0.85
0.77
0.51

The case of sunflow illustrates the need for the metric Rank-90%-T. For
sunflow, a user needs to inspect 838 of the 958 alarms produced to discover all
bugs. However, the user discovers 90% of the true alarms within just 483 iterations.
The more detailed comparison between Bingo and BaseC presented in Figures 4.2
and 4.3, demonstrates that Bingo has a consistently higher yield of true alarms than
BaseC.
hedc (total = 152)
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Figure 4.2: Comparing the interaction runs produced by Bingo and BaseC for the
datarace benchmarks. The y-axis shows the number of alarms inspected by the user,
the “•” and “×” indicate the rounds in which the first and last true alarms were
discovered, and the boxes indicate the rounds in which 25%, 50%, and 75% of the
true alarms were discovered. Each measurement for BaseC is itself the median of
5 independent runs.
While we provided the succinct AUC metric for all the benchmarks in the earlier
tables, we show a representative and a detailed ROC plot for the ftp benchmark
in Figure 4.4. The solid line is the ROC curve for Bingo, while the dotted lines
are the ranking runs for each of the runs of BaseC, and the diagonal line is the
expected behavior of BaseR. Observe that Bingo outperforms BaseC not just in
the aggregate, but across each of the individual runs.
On a scale ranging from 0 to 1, on average, the AUC for Bingo exceeds that of
BaseC by 0.13 and of BaseR by 0.37. In summary, we conclude that Bingo is
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Figure 4.3: Comparing the interaction runs produced by Bingo and BaseC for the
taint benchmarks. The y-axis shows the number of alarms inspected by the user,
the “•” and “×” indicate the rounds in which the first and last true alarms were
discovered, and the boxes indicate the rounds in which 25%, 50%, and 75% of the
true alarms were discovered. Each measurement for BaseC is itself the median of
5 independent runs.
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Figure 4.4: The ROC curves for ftp. The solid line is the curve for Bingo, while
the dotted lines are the curves for each of the runs of the BaseC.
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indeed effective at ranking alarms, and can significantly reduce the number of false
alarms that a user needs to triage.

4.2.4

Measuring Robustness

To evaluate the robustness of Bingo, we measure the deterioration in the ranking
of Bingo when it is provided with small amounts of erroneous feedback. Such
a deterioration in Bingo’s performance is possible because the alarm ranking it
produces depends on the labelling of alarms by a human user: incorrect labelling will
adversely affect ranking. First we performed a user study to estimate the approximate
number of alarms that typical programmers incorrectly label, as a percentage of the
total number of alarms they label.
We placed an advertisement on upwork.com, an online portal for freelance programmers. We presented respondents with a tutorial on dataraces, and gave them a
5-question test based on a small test program. Based on their performance in the
test, we chose 21 of the 27 respondents, and assigned each of these developers to one
of the benchmarks, hedc, ftp, weblech, and jspider. We gave them 20 alarms for
labelling with an 8–10 hour time limit, such that each alarm was inspected by at
least 5 independent programmers. To encourage thoughtful answers, we also asked
them to provide simple explanations with their responses. We found that, for 90% of
the questions, the majority vote among the responses resulted in the correct label.
Equivalently, when a group of professional programmers are made to vote on the
ground truth of an alarm, they incorrectly label 10% of the alarms.
We extrapolated the results of this study and simulated the runs of Bingo on
ftp where the feedback labels had been corrupted with noise. In Table 4.5, we
measure the ranks at which 90% and 100% of the alarms labelled true appear, when
we corrupted feedback labels with 1%, 5% and 10% noise respectively. As is expected
of an outlier, the rank of the last true alarm degrades from 103 in the original setting
to 203 in the presence of noise, but the rank at which 90% of the true alarms have
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been inspected increases more gracefully, from 80 originally to 98 in the presence of
10% noise. In all cases, Bingo outperforms the original BaseC. We conclude that
Bingo can robustly tolerate reasonable amounts of user error.

Rank-90%-T

AUC

Exact

Tool

4.2.5

Rank-100%-T

Bingo
BaseC

103
368

80
290

0.98
0.78

Noisy

Table 4.5: Robustness of Bingo with varying amounts of user error in labelling
alarms for the ftp benchmark. Each value is the median of three measurements.

Bingo (1% noise)
Bingo (5% noise)
Bingo (10% noise)

111
128
203

85
88
98

0.97
0.93
0.86

Discovering New Bugs

Here we primarily investigate if Bingo helps to discover new bugs that are actually
bugs missed by precise static and dynamic analysis tools (i.e., the false negatives of
these tools). This would establish Bingo as a viable alternative to programmers
who prefer to use precise program analysis tools that promise low false positive
rates [30], despite the fact that such precise tools miss detecting many true bugs.
To investigate this, we ran two state-of-the-art precise datarace detectors:

(a) a

static datarace detector in the Chord [64] framework with unsound flags turned on
to increase precision, and (b) FastTrack [26], a dynamic datarace detector based on
the happens-before relation. We ran FastTrack with the inputs that were supplied
with the benchmarks.
We present the number of alarms produced and the number of bugs missed by
each analyzer in Table 4.6. For example, by turning on the unsound options, we
reduce the number of alarms produced by Chord from 522 to 211, but end up missing
39 real dataraces. Using Bingo, however, a user discovers all true alarms within just
45

Table 4.6: The number of real dataraces missed by Chord’s datarace analysis with
unsound settings, and the FastTrack dynamic datarace detector, for 8 Java benchmarks. New bugs are the real dataraces proposed by Bingo but missed by both.
LTR is the rank at which Bingo discovers all true alarms.
Program
hedc
ftp
weblech
jspider
avrora
luindex
sunflow
xalan
Total

Chord, soundy
Total Bugs
152
12
522
75
30
6
257
9
978
29
940
2
958
171
1,870
75
5,707
379

Chord, unsound
Missed by
Total
Bugs Missed FastTrack
55
6
6
5
211
36
39
29
7
4
2
0
52
5
4
2
9
4
25
7
494
2
0
1
506
94
77
151
80
52
23
8
1,414
203
176
203

Bingo
New bugs LTR
3
67
14
103
0
11
0
20
6
410
0
14
69
838
8
273
100
1,736

103 iterations, thereby discovering 108% more dataraces while inspecting 51% fewer
alarms.
Aggregating across all our benchmarks, there are 379 real dataraces, of which
the unsound Chord analysis reports only 203 and produces 1,414 alarms. Bingo
discovers all 379 dataraces within a total of just 1,736 iterations. The user therefore
discovers 87% more dataraces by just inspecting 23% more alarms. In all, using
Bingo allows the user to inspect 100 new bugs which were not reported either by
FastTrack, or by Chord in its unsound setting.
Furthermore, the analysis flags determine the number of alarms produced in an
unpredictable way: reducing it from 958 alarms to 506 alarms for sunflow, but from
1,870 alarms to 80 alarms for xalan. In contrast, Bingo provides the user with much
more control over how much effort they would like to spend to find bugs.

4.2.6

Impact of Optimizations on Scalability

The optimizations performed on the derivation graph as explained in section 3.2.3
reduce its size greatly. This makes Bingo scale to large programs. In this section we
perform measurements to quantify this reduction. We present measurements of the
running time of one iteration of Bingo and of BaseC in Tables 4.7 and 4.8, with
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Table 4.7: Sizes of the Bayesian networks processed by Bingo, and of the MaxSAT
problems processed by BaseC, and their effect on iteration time, for the datarace
benchmarks. The column heading #Tup is the number of tuples, #Cl is the number
of clauses, and #Var is the number of variables, all measured in kilos (K). The
heading IterT is the iteration time in seconds.
Program
hedc
ftp
weblech
jspider
avrora
luindex
sunflow
xalan

Bingo, optimized
#Tup #Cl IterT
2.2
3.1
46
25
40 1,341
0.31 0.38
3
9
15
570
11
22
649
5.3
6.5
41
59
96 3,636
19
32
489

Bingo, unoptimized
#Tup
#Cl
IterT
753
789
12,689
2,067
2,182
37,447
497
524
7,950
1,126
1,188
12,982
1,552
1,824
47,552
488
522
9,334
9,632 11,098 timeout
2,452
2,917
51,812

#Vars
1,298
2,859
1,498
1,507
2,305
1,584
26,025
6,418

BaseC
#Cl
IterT
1,468
194
3,470
559
1,718
290
1,858
240
3,007
1,094
1,834
379
34,218 timeout
8,660 timeout

Table 4.8: Sizes of the Bayesian networks processed by Bingo, and of the MaxSAT
problems processed by BaseC, and their effect on iteration time, for the taint
benchmarks. The column heading #Tup is the number of tuples, #Cl is the number
of clauses, and #Var is the number of variables, all measured in kilos (K). The
heading IterT is the iteration time in seconds.
Program
app-324
nsounds
app-ca7
app-kQm
tmazes
atrail
gmaster
app-018

Bingo, optimized
#Tup #Cl IterT
0.39
1.6
83
0.73
1.9
41
1.6
4.9
72
2.9
10
234
1.3
3.6
57
0.42
1.3
1
1.6
7.8
418
2.3
9.9
302

Bingo, unoptimized
#Tup #Cl
IterT
29 1,033 14,710
36
277
1,204
90 1,367
1,966
186 3,978
7,742
69 1,047
2,843
13
72
183
158 3,274
7,335
223 4,950 20,622

#Vars
129
78
161
316
153
74
315
486

BaseC
#Cl
1,178
407
1,528
4,495
1,198
145
3,857
6,803

IterT
86
39
123
311
84
17
303
426

and without optimizations. The iteration time corresponds to one run of the belief
propagation algorithm, and is directly dependent on the size of the Bayesian network.
We indicate this size by the columns labelled #Tup and #Cl. In contrast, BaseC
invokes a MaxSAT solver in each iteration, and the columns labelled #Vars and #Cl
indicate the size of the formula presented to the solver. Observe the massive gains in
performance—on average, an improvement of 265×—as a result of the co-reachability
based pruning and chain compression, because of which Bingo can handle even large
benchmark programs such as xalan and sunflow, on which BaseC times out.
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4.3

End-to-End System: Presto

The system Presto is another implementation of the alarm ranking system. We
instantiate Presto to rank the alarms reported by an exception flow analysis, which
is described in detail in Section 4.3.1. In order to compute the probability of alarms
reported by the exception flow analysis, Presto leverages the completeness of
dynamic analysis.
The exception flow analysis finds the exception objects that may escape from the
main method of an analyzed program, and reports them as alarms. In order to compute
this, the exception flow analysis relies on the facts deduced by three other underlying
analyses applied to the analyzed program. Presto applies probabilistic reasoning
only to the derivations of the exception flow analysis and does not (probabilistically)
analyze the other underlying analyses. Instead, Presto treats the outputs of
the underlying analyses as input relations of the exception flow analysis. While
constructing the probabilistic model of the exception flow analysis, Presto views the
tuples of each relation input to the exception flow analysis as either complete (known
with certainty), or incomplete (probabilistic). Tuples of input relations that are read
off the program text are treated as complete. Tuples of input relations that have
been produced by underlying analyses are treated as incomplete. This is because the
underlying analyses producing these relations may be potentially incomplete. The
specific input relations that are treated as incomplete is described in Section 4.3.2.
Presto hypothesizes that an alarm is at least as incomplete as the analysis facts
it is premised upon. In order to compute the probability of an alarm, Presto
seeks probability estimates from a dynamic analysis, for the incomplete input tuples
on which the alarm depends. More on how the dynamic analysis estimates these
probabilities is described in Section 4.3.3. To compute alarm probabilities, Presto
propagates the probabilities of input tuples by performing marginal inference on a
Bayesian network extracted from the derivation graph of the exception flow analysis.
We show the workflow of Presto in Figure 4.5. The following subsections
48

Incomplete
EDB Relations

Program
to be
analyzed

__________
_______
_____________
___________
_____________
________
___________

Constraint
generator

Analysis
specified in
Datalog

Optional
Feedback

Dynamic
Analysis
machine
learning
Bayesian
inference

EDB
probabilities

✓ ..... Labeled Alarms
✘ .....
✓ .....

1. .....
2. .....
3. .....

INPUTS

……………..

OUTPUTS
………………

RULES

…………….

Ranked Alarms

Bayesian Network

Figure 4.5: The Presto workflow.

elaborate each of the above aspects further. The present implementation does not
recompute alarm probabilities conditioned on user feedback - it produces a one-time
ranked list of alarms, and the interaction loop involving the user is not present.
Moreover, seeking probability estimates for input tuples, from a dynamic analysis
places its own requirements and challenges which are discussed in Section 4.3.4.
We formally describe the workflow of Presto in Algorithm 3. Presto is
parameterized by a Datalog analysis D, a program P , and a set of input relation
names pI that are potentially incomplete. Certain steps of the algorithm executed
by Presto bear similarity to the steps executed by Bingo while others differ. The
execution of the Datalog analysis D on program P , in steps 1 and 2 is similar in both
systems.
Steps 3 and 4 are executed differently by Presto and Bingo. These differences
are not inherent to Presto or Bingo. Rather, the differences are driven primarily
by the characteristics of the client static analyses. The derivation graphs of the client
analysis in Presto track deductive steps at the granularity of methods, whereas
the derivation graphs of the client analyses in Bingo track deductive steps at the
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Algorithm 3 Presto(D, P, pI), where D is the analysis expressed in Datalog, P is
the program to be analyzed, and pI is the set of input relations treated probabilistically.
It returns a ranked list of alarms RO.
1. Let I = InputRelationsD (P ). Populate all input relations I using the program
text and prior analysis results.
2. Let (C, O, GC) = DatalogSolve(D, I). C is the set of derived tuples, O ⊆ C is
the set of alarms produced, and GC is the set of grounded constraints.
3. Compute GCc := CycleElimDfs(I, C, GC). Eliminate cycles from the grounded
constraints.
4. (Optionally,) Update GCc := Optimize(I, GCc , O). Reduce the size of the set of
grounded constraints.
5. Compute pi = DynamicAnalysis(P, GCc , pI). pi is the probability vector for
input tuples of the relations in set pI, that occur in some clause of GCc .
6. Construct Bayesian network BN from GCc and pi, and let Pr be its joint probability distribution.
7. RO = Sort(O, Pr). Produce a ranked list of alarms RO by sorting on Pr(o) for
o ∈ O, by decreasing probability.
8. Return RO.

granularity of program points. This makes the derivation graphs processed by Bingo
extremely large (≈ 1–10 million grounded constraints) in comparison. Therefore,
Bingo uses aggressive cycle elimination to help reduce the size of the derivation
graph in addition to eliminating cycles. Whereas, it is feasible for Presto to use the
more precise dfs-based algorithm of Section 5.3 for cycle elimination in step 3. Step 4
in Presto performs only the coreachability optimization, and not chain compression
(Section 3.2.3). Bingo performs both the optimizations. This is because derivation
graphs processed by Bingo have chains of deductive steps that are amenable to
effective chain compression, unlike the derivation graphs processed by Presto.
In step 5 of Algorithm 3, Presto seeks probabilities for incomplete input tuples
that participate in the derivation of alarms, from a dynamic analysis. Section 4.3.3
50

describes how the dynamic analysis computes these probabilities. Step 6 uses an
off-the-shelf solver [59] to compute the joint probability distribution.

4.3.1

Client Analysis

Exception Flow Analysis
The client analysis for Presto is a static exception flow analysis that is performed
on .NET executables containing MSIL (Microsoft Intermediate Language) bytecode.
Programs raise exceptions (i.e., create and throw exception objects) to flag error
conditions encountered during execution. These exception objects propagate through
the program and are programmatically handled in different ways. For example, they
may be:

(a) stored in a field of an object for later retrieval, (b) encapsulated in

other exception objects, (c) caught in a catch block, (d) caught and rethrown, or
(e) propagated up the method call chain. The exception flow analysis tracks the flow
of exception objects through all these operations, and reports the exception objects
escaping from the executable, as alarms.
The exception flow analysis is built on top of:
1. A path-sensitive intraprocedural exception analysis that computes the set of
program points in a method that can throw an exception that may escape the
method (i.e., may not be caught within the method).
2. A soundy context- and flow-insensitive pointer-cum-exception analysis [14] that
computes the call-graph, the points-to sets, and also the set of all exception
objects that may escape from an executable. It uses the intraprocedural
exception analysis to compute points-to sets involving exception objects. It is
implemented in the DAFFODIL [45] framework. This analysis is sound modulo
the treatment of Windows library methods: (a) some methods are soundly
analyzed, (b) some methods are modeled as approximations of their original
counterparts, sound w.r.t. the tracked heap objects, and (c) some methods are
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modeled as no-ops. The analysis also ignores reflection and calls to Windows
runtime. Additionally, it treats asynchronous method calls as synchronous.
This is a sound approximation because the analysis is flow-insensitive.
3. A context-insensitive exception link analysis that computes all possible “linked”
pairs, where a linked pair comprises an exception catch block and a throw
statement such that an exception caught by the catch block might be rethrown by
the throw statement. The exception link analysis uses the points-to information
produced by the pointer-cum-exception analysis.
The exception flow analysis that is based on the above underlying analyses, is a
precise but unsound computation of exception propagation paths through the callgraph. It computes all feasible paths in the call-graph through which an exception
object may propagate from the method where it is created, to either: (a) methods
from which it does not escape, or (b) the main method from which it may escape. To
find these paths, the exception flow analysis recognizes that:
1. Methods that may “catch and rethrow”, “catch, wrap and throw” or “catch,
unwrap and throw” an exception object, may be intermediate nodes in its
propagation path. Here, by “wrap and throw” we mean the encapsulation of
an exception object within another exception object that is then thrown. By
“unwrap and throw” we mean the inverse operation in which an encapsulated
exception object is extracted and thrown.
2. In case of asynchronous programs, methods that may “catch and store (into
a field of a heap object)” an exception object may be intermediate nodes in
its propagation path because the exception object may propagate further if
another method retrieves it from the field and throws it.
Therefore the exception flow analysis makes the following two unsound assumptions
(corresponding to the two observations made above) while finding the exception
propagation paths:
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1. The analysis assumes that if an exception object is rethrown, then the rethrow
happens within the lexical scope of some catch block where the exception object
may be caught.
2. The analysis assumes that a field store/load of an exception object happens
only because of asynchrony: An exception object is stored into a field of a
Task [1] object only by an asynchronous method, and it is retrieved from that
field and rethrown only by the method that awaits the completion of execution
of the asynchronous method.
While finding exception propagation paths in both the above scenarios, the exception
flow analysis accounts for the fact that an exception object may get wrapped, or
unwrapped along a propagation path.
The only impact of the above unsound assumptions is that the propagation
path of an exception object may be broken up into two or more disjoint segments,
which the exception flow analysis is unable to link together. We elaborate with an
example. Suppose an exception object is thrown at a program point labelled A. It
propagates up the program call graph and is caught at some catch block labelled
B. This catch block has a method to process exceptions, so the exception object is
passed to this method. This method now throws the exception object at a program
point labelled C. The exception object propagates further and escapes through the
Main method. The complete propagation path for the exception object is therefore:
A → ... → B → C → ... → M ain. Note that as the program point C is not
within the lexical scope of the catch block B, the exception flow analysis loses the
link B → C. This results in two disjoint propagation paths for the exception object:
A → ... → B and C → ... → M ain.
The exception flow analysis together with all its underlying analyses, comprises
164 rules and 151 relations. In order to rank the alarms reported by the exception flow
analysis, Presto needs to associate with each exception object a probability with
which it may escape from the executable. We hypothesize that this is the probability
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that there exists a likely feasible path in the call-graph through which the exception
object may propagate from the method where it is created, to the main method from
which it may escape. In order to compute this probability, Presto instruments the
rules of the exception flow analysis, and treats the outputs of the analyses underlying
it as incomplete input relations.

4.3.2

Incomplete EDB Tuples

While constructing the Bayesian network from a derivation graph of the exception
flow analysis, Presto treats tuples of EDB relations extracted from program text
as complete (i.e., known to be true with certainty). Whereas, Presto treats the
tuples of intermediate relations that are inputs to the exception flow analysis, but
are outputs of the analyses underlying it, as incomplete and seeks probabilities for
such tuples from a dynamic analysis.
These relations, pictorially illustrated in Figure 4.6, are:
1. The relation CallAt that is produced by the interprocedural pointer-cumexception analysis. It contains tuples (meth, P 1, calleeM ) indicating that
method calleeM may be called by the method meth at the program point P 1.
2. The relation EscapeExc that is produced by the intraprocedural exception
analysis. It contains tuples (meth, excT ype, P 2) indicating that an exception
of type excT ype, thrown at the program point P 2, may escape from method
meth. Note that the analysis producing this relation is intraprocedural, and
hence it follows that the method meth contains the program point P 2.
3. The relation LinkedExc that is produced by the exception link analysis. It
contains tuples (CB, P 3, excT ype) indicating that a catch block CB may catch
an exception of type excT ype that may be rethrown at the program point P 3.
Note that while it is possible for CB and P 3 to belong to different methods,
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meth()
{
...
call calleeM
...
}

// P1

meth()
{
try
{
...
throw e // P2
...
}
catch { ... }
}

meth()
{
try
{ ... }
catch (e)
{
...
throw e
...
}
}

// CB

// P3

1

Figure 4.6: The tuples of the EDB relations that Presto treats as incomplete. The
relation CallAt says that method meth may call method calleeM at program point
P 1, the relation EscapeExc says that the statement at program point P 2 may throw
an exception of type excT ype that may escape from method meth, and finally the
relation LinkedExc says that an exception of type excT ype that may be thrown by
the statement at program point P 3 is related to the exception that may be caught
by the catch block CB.

such a programming style is uncommon among programmers and therefore
Presto does not handle this case, as explained in Section 4.3.1.
In addition to the above relations, there are three other important relations
that are produced by the pointer-cum-exception analysis, that are used in the
exception link analysis and also the exception flow analysis. These are the pointsto relations: variable points-to, static field points-to and instance field points-to.
Presto conservatively treats the tuples of these relations as complete even though
they are, arguably, incomplete. This is because these relations involve abstract heap
objects each of which may correspond to multiple concrete heap objects. Therefore
trying to estimate probabilities for such tuples will make the dynamic analysis
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extremely complex, and practically infeasible.

4.3.3

EDB Tuple Probabilities from Dynamic Analysis

Inspired by the approach taken in previous work [71, 7], we proceed to define a way
of estimating the probability of an input tuple. We associate each input relation with
two “states” of program execution that are observable by a dynamic analysis. We
shall refer to these two states as the “pre-state” and the “post-state”. For example,
for the input tuple CallAt(meth, P 1, calleeM ):
1. the pre-state is “program execution reaches P 1 in method meth”, and
2. the post-state is “method calleeM is called at P 1”.
Note that the pre-state and the post-state are associated with an input relation,
but are parameterized by the arguments of the tuples in that relation. We interpret
Pr(t) for an input tuple t, as the probability that the program execution reaches the
post-state, assuming that program execution is in the pre-state. This interpretation
is justified in [71] in which it is an essential assumption that the probability of the
program execution following a particular branch is independent of the execution
history. However, such an assumption is necessary to get a handle on the problem
being tackled.
We now specify the pre-state and post-state for the other two input relations
treated probabilistically by Presto, namely, EscapeExc and LinkedExc.
1. For a tuple t of the form EscapeExc(meth, excT ype, P 2):
(a) the pre-state is “an exception of type excT ype is raised at program point
P 2 of method meth”, and
(b) the post-state is "an exception of type excT ype escapes from method
meth".
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2. For a tuple t with form LinkedExc(CB, P 3, excT ype):
(a) the pre-state is “the catch block CB catches an exception of type excT ype”,
and
(b) the post-state is “the program point P 3 throws an exception of type
excT ype”.
One immediate concern arises: it is very difficult to realize the above pre-states during
program execution because it is hard to find program inputs that trigger exceptions
at specific program points. The dynamic analysis that Presto works with, needs to
have the capability to inject exceptions. With this capability, a dynamic analysis
will be able to observe the above pre- and post-states.
For each incomplete input tuple t, the dynamic analysis counts the number of
times it observes the pre-state and post-state over all the program executions that it
is able to observe, and records the following:
1. f reqtpre : the number of times the dynamic analysis observed the program
execution reaching the pre-state, and
2. f reqtpost : the number of times the dynamic analysis observed the program
execution reaching post-state, given that the program execution was already in
the pre-state.
We then estimate the probability of a tuple t as follows:
Pr(t) = Pmin + (Pmax − Pmin ) ∗

 f req

tpost

1/K

f reqtpre

where Pmin and Pmax are the minimum and maximum probabilities that an input
tuple can have, and K is a tunable parameter. We explain further below.
The parameter K has the effect of increasing the impact of f reqtpost . Alternatively,
K has the effect of decreasing the impact of f reqtpre - f reqtpost . This is the number
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of times a post-state was not observed in spite of the execution being in a valid
pre-state. We may need to tune the value of K in order to control this “impact” in
certain situations as described next. It is generally difficult to trigger error conditions
during test runs of the program, such that the post-states representing error handling
code, are observed by the dynamic analysis. As a result, the dynamic analysis may
observe a high number of instances in which the post-states were not observed in spite
of the pre-states being observed. In the context of Presto, a post-state examines
exception handling in a situation when an error may occur. Such missed observations
of a post-state will decrease the probability of an exception escaping the executable.
Under the assumption that an error occurs, we want this probability to be high if the
exception indeed escapes the executable. Therefore, we need to increase the “impact”
of the post-states that have been observed, as compared to the post-states that have
not been observed. We call the parameter K as the impact factor because it helps to
produce this effect.
The values Pmin and Pmax are required because a dynamic analysis is not sound in general, it is not possible for a dynamic analysis to observe every possible path
during program execution. Therefore, Pmin > 0 and Pmax < 1. All of Pmin , Pmax and
K are tunable parameters that will impact the ranking of alarms and they need to
be configured to be empirically effective.

4.3.4

Dynamic Analysis: Requirements and Challenges

This section discusses the requirements placed on a dynamic analysis by Presto,
and the challenges faced by the dynamic analysis in satisfying these requirements.
This discussion applies to any dynamic analysis that may interface with Presto.
To evaluate Presto, we used a proprietary dynamic analysis provided by Microsoft
Research, Redmond, that had the necessary capabilities to interface with Presto.
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Requirements
For each kind of observation that a dynamic analysis has to make, instrumentation
customized to the observation needs to be inserted into the program executable. For
example, to track method calls, a dynamic analysis needs to insert instrumentation
to log at all program points where method calls are made. A more complex example
is when a dynamic analysis has to inject a fault (in the context of Presto, an
exception) and observe its effects. Typical fault injection requirements placed by
Presto have two forms:
1. When a program statement S in method A throws an exception of type T , a
dynamic analysis needs to observe if this exception escapes from method A.
Here, the program statement S is either a throw statement or a method call.
2. When a catch block CB catches an exception of type T , a dynamic analysis
needs to observe if a throw statement A within the lexical scope of the catch
block CB, throws this exception. Here, in order to ensure that the catch block
CB catches an exception of type T , there is an implicit requirement for some
statement in the try block associated with the catch block CB, to throw an
exception of type T .
In order to realize such scenarios during program execution, and make the corresponding observations, a dynamic analysis needs to insert instrumentation both in
the caller, and in the callee methods involved in a scenario.
Challenges
A dynamic analysis faces two primary challenges in order to satisfy the above
requirements:
1. The challenge of instrumenting large libraries. The programs that Presto
analyzes link with a large number of massive framework libraries. In order
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to log all method calls, nearly every method except the leaf methods, in all
the linked libraries needs to be instrumented. This entails huge costs in terms
of instrumentation time, memory footprint of the instrumented assemblies,
and a potentially unacceptable degradation in the instrumented program’s
performance. To resolve this issue, dynamic analyses typically find a tradeoff
point that entails instrumenting only specified assemblies. The impact of this
for Presto is that the dynamic analysis will not be able to provide probability
estimates for tuples that refer to uninstrumented code.
2. The challenge of constructing an exception object to inject. In order to provide
probability estimates for certain kinds of tuples, the dynamic analysis needs
to insert instrumentation that throws an exception object. Such an exception
object may potentially be a complex object with nested exceptions and many
other reference fields. It is non-trivial to construct such an object. To resolve
this issue, dynamic analyses may construct exception objects using default
constructors or rely on the user to provide all the necessary information. The
impact of this for Presto is that if the dynamic analysis is allowed to construct
exception objects using default constructors, then the observations it makes
may not match actual concrete program executions. If Presto has to provide
all necessary information, then it needs more sophisticated program analyses to
automatically gather the relevant information.
Apart from the challenges above that are faced by a dynamic analysis, Presto
faces a challenge in using such dynamic analyses to get probability estimates for
tuples. It is the challenge of scalability: Presto needs to execute the dynamic
analysis several times. For tracking method calls, one execution of the dynamic
analysis for each available program input, suffices. The probability estimates for all
call-graph tuples can be extracted from this set of executions. Whereas, one such
set of executions of the dynamic analysis is required for each tuple of the relations
EscapeExc and LinkedExc, each of which represents a fault injection scenario. This
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is because a fault injection scenario corresponds to exactly one tuple. That is, for
each single fault injection scenario, if we execute the dynamic analysis on all available
inputs, we obtain a probability estimate for one tuple.
Two possible approaches to alleviate this problem may be:
1. Presto should not seek probability estimates from the dynamic analysis for
all tuples of the relations EscapeExc and LinkedExc. It should selectively
choose relevant or impacting tuples. But determining relevant or impacting
tuples is non-trivial, and can be a direction for future research. A simpler
alternative is to take a heuristic approach that limits the total number of tuples
that represent fault injection scenarios, for which Presto seeks probability
estimates, to some constant N . These tuples could be the N most frequently
occurring tuples in the derivation graph.
2. Presto can adopt engineering approaches like executing various instances of
the dynamic analysis in parallel on multiple machines or processors. Another
option is to execute the dynamic analysis on only a subset of the available
inputs. But choosing an appropriate subset of inputs is a problem in its own
right.
The approach that the current implementation of Presto takes during evaluation
is to manually limit program inputs to small subsets of the available inputs. This
approach suffices for the current set of benchmarks as they are not stressing Presto
beyond its scalability limits.

4.4

Presto: Experimental Evaluation

In this section, we describe the evaluation of Presto. We start by giving details
about the benchmarks used for the evaluation ((Section 4.4.1). Unfortunately, we
were unable to find any static analysis tools that found exception flow bugs for .NET
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executables. Hence we do not have any reference baseline against which we can
calibrate the performance of Presto.
For the evaluation, we primarily did two things: (a) measured effectiveness: how
effective is Presto in ranking alarms (Section 4.4.2), and (b) performed parameter tuning: what parameter values make Presto produce an empirically optimal
ranking (Section 4.4.3). In addition to the above, we investigated to what extent the
optimization employed by Presto helped to scale its applicability (Section 4.4.4).

4.4.1

Benchmarks

We evaluated Presto on the suite of 6 benchmarks shown in Table 4.9. These
benchmarks are mid-sized C# programs got from public repositories like github.com
and codeproject.com. For these benchmarks, the static analysis of many of the
system classes of the .NET framework has been suppressed. This approach is
commonly adopted for framework-based applications (Ex.: applications in the Android
framework). In the context of Presto, two specific reasons are:
1. The Rapid Type Analysis (RTA) implementation does not scale when the
analysis of many of the .NET framework classes is not suppressed.
2. Scalar types (like int, short) are represented in the .NET framework as struct
types (like Int32, Int16). While in general, struct types are modeled as objects
on the heap and tracked during pointer analysis, scalar types that are internally
represented as struct types are not tracked. Therefore the analysis of such
struct types can be suppressed.
Table 4.10 gives various metrics that indicate the size of the benchmarks. We obtained
the ground truth for the alarms reported by the exception flow analysis applied to
these benchmarks, by manual inspection.
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Table 4.9: Benchmark description.
Program
AsyncJobDispatcher
AsyncWebCrawler
FilePkgUtil
HtmlSanitizer
ScrambledSquares
AsyncWaveformGenerator

Description
Asynchronous master-worker based job dispatcher using an FSM
Asynchronous web crawler
File packaging utility
White list rule-based HTML sanitizer
Game solver with a backtracking algorithm
Asynchronous generator of waveforms from MP4 audio file

Table 4.10: Benchmark characteristics. ‘Total’ and ‘App’ columns are numbers after
RTA (Rapid Type Analysis) was performed for scope construction. The numbers
specified under the ‘Total’ columns include both application code and the unsuppressed
system libraries of the .NET framework. The numbers specified under the ‘App’
columns include only application code.
Program
AsyncJobDispatcher
AsyncWebCrawler
FilePkgUtil
HtmlSanitizer
ScrambledSquares
AsyncWaveformGenerator

4.4.2

# Classes
Total App
285
21
217
19
323
5
237
29
171
8
258
10

# Methods
Total App
923
117
637
59
1526
19
1019
263
601
73
813
87

Bytecode (KLOC)
Total
App
16.7
1.8
14.3
1.6
34.4
0.5
35.8
2.0
13.2
1.3
18.5
3.1

Measuring Effectiveness

We measure the effectiveness of Presto using the following two metrics:
1. The rank at which the last true alarm is discovered (Last true rank).
2. The area under the ROC curve (AUC). As explained in detail in Section 4.2.3,
the AUC is a succinct metric that measures the goodness of a ranking. Larger
the AUC, better is the ranking.
We present our measurements of both the metrics for Presto in Table 4.11. The
expected value of the AUC for random ranking is 0.5. Observe that the AUC of the
ranking produced by Presto for each of the benchmarks is well above 0.5. Over all
benchmarks, on average, a user needs to inspect 64% fewer alarms as compared to
inspecting all alarms.
Figure 4.7 shows the ROC plots for two representative benchmarks. The dotted
red line in these plots is the expected behavior of random ranking. Intuitively, the
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Table 4.11: Summary of metrics for the effectiveness of Presto. Last true rank
indicates the rank at which all of the true alarms have been inspected.
Total
alarms
28
24
18
40
15
22

Program

1.0

1.0

0.8

0.8
True Positive Ratio

True Positive Ratio

AsyncJobDispatcher
AsyncWebCrawler
FilePkgUtil
HtmlSanitizer
ScrambledSquares
AsyncWaveformGenerator

True
alarms
2
3
4
7
1
4

0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
0.0

% True
alarms
7.14%
12.5%
22.22%
17.5%
6.67%
18.18%

Last true
rank
4
15
7
19
2
6

AUC
0.94
0.78
0.89
0.82
0.93
0.89

0.6
0.4
0.2

0.2

0.4
0.6
False Positive Ratio

0.8

1.0

(a) AsyncJobDispatcher.

0.0
0.0

0.2

0.4
0.6
False Positive Ratio

0.8

1.0

(b) HtmlSanitizer.

Figure 4.7: The ROC plots for two benchmarks. The diagonal dotted line in red is
the expected behavior of random ranking (with expected AUC = 0.5). The AUC for
AsyncJobDispatcher is 0.94 and the AUC for HtmlSanitizer is 0.82.

farther away the curve is above the diagonal, better is the ranking. Therefore, the
area under this curve indicates how high up true alarms are in the ranking.
Figure 4.8 shows a snippet of the HTML reports generated by Presto that
shows the probabilities assigned to individual tuples and derivation steps. This report
snapshot shows how a tuple T hrowM H(0, 60) was derived by the exception flow
analysis. Tuple T hrowM H(0, 60) represents the fact that an exception object that
is identified by the number 60, is thrown by method M ain that is identified by the
number 0. The report shows the two ways in which tuple T hrowM H(0, 60) can be
derived, in the two bottom rows. Each of these rows represents a disjunction: the body
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Figure 4.8: Snapshot of an HTML report page generated by Presto that shows the
probabilities assigned to individual tuples and derivation steps.
of an instantiated Datalog rule that was applied to derive tuple T hrowM H(0, 60).
Within each row, are the conjuncts: the tuples that comprise the body of the
instantiated Datalog rule. Notice that every tuple and every disjunct is assigned a
probability by Presto.
Delving further into this report, we observe that it indicates that the exception
object identified by the number 60 may be thrown by the M ain method if either:
1. it is thrown by the method GenerateP ackage called by M ain at line 30, or
2. it is thrown by the method GetF ilenameF ileContentDictionary called by
M ain at line 33.
Observe further that Presto assigns a low probability of 0.21253 to the path
represented by (1) above, and a much higher probability of 0.842372 to the path
represented by (2) above. Studying the reports generated by Presto and examining
the probabilities it assigns to individual facts and rules, will help a user in finding
highly likely paths along which an exception might escape the program executable.

4.4.3

Tuning Parameter Values

As we saw in Section 4.3.3, the computation performed by a dynamic analysis to
estimate the probability of a tuple, is parameterized by three entities:
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1. the maximum probability that a tuple can have, Pmax ,
2. the minimum probability that a tuple can have, Pmin , and
3. the impact factor, K.
In this section we discuss the experiments performed to find optimal values for these
parameters. We computed the AUCs for all benchmarks for all combinations of:
1. K = {1, 4}
2. Pmax = {0.999, 0.985}
3. Pmin = {0.5, 0.4, 0.1, 0.05}
Table 4.12 shows the results of our experiments. Based on these experiments, the
optimal values of the above parameters are: K = 4, Pmax = 0.985 and Pmin = 0.05.
Table 4.12: AUC computations for all benchmarks, with different parameter values.
The tunable parameters of Presto are: the impact factor K, the maximum and
minimum probability an alarm can have, Pmax and Pmin respectively.
Program
Pmin →
AsyncJobDispatcher
AsyncWebCrawler
FilePkgUtil
HtmlSanitizer
ScrambledSquares
AsyncWaveformGenerator

0.50
0.77
0.59
0.54
0.77
0.79
0.89

Program
Pmin →
AsyncJobDispatcher
AsyncWebCrawler
FilePkgUtil
HtmlSanitizer
ScrambledSquares
AsyncWaveformGenerator

0.50
0.77
0.59
0.50
0.70
0.79
0.89

Impact factor K = 4
Pmax = 0.999
Pmax = 0.985
0.40
0.10
0.05
0.50
0.40
0.10
0.88
0.92
0.92
0.75
0.75
0.94
0.60
0.78
0.78
0.52
0.59
0.70
0.54
0.89
0.89
0.54
0.57
0.89
0.79
0.84
0.84
0.75
0.78
0.82
0.86
0.93
0.93
0.79
0.86
0.93
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
Impact factor K = 1
Pmax = 0.999
Pmax = 0.985
0.40
0.10
0.05
0.50
0.40
0.10
0.88
0.92
0.92
0.75
0.75
0.94
0.60
0.78
0.78
0.52
0.59
0.70
0.50
0.54
0.71
0.50
0.50
0.61
0.72
0.78
0.78
0.68
0.69
0.78
0.86
0.93
0.93
0.79
0.86
0.93
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89

0.05
0.94
0.78
0.89
0.82
0.93
0.89

0.05
0.94
0.78
0.71
0.78
0.93
0.89

Note that on closer inspection of the measurements, we observe very interesting
behaviors like:
66

1. Benchmarks FilePkgUtil and to a lesser extent, HtmlSanitizer are sensitive
to the impact factor K. As anticipated in the discussion in Section 4.3.3, it is
indeed the case that Benchmark FilePkgUtil has two executions to exercise
error handling paths in the program, and one execution of the dynamic analysis
for a typical input. In spite of this, it is necessary to increase the impact of the
observations made by the dynamic analysis during the “error handling” runs of
the benchmark, to get a good ranking of alarms.
2. Benchmarks

AsyncJobDispatcher,

AsyncWebCrawler,

FilePkgUtil,

ScrambledSquares and HtmlSanitizer are all sensitive to the value of the
minimum tuple probability, Pmin . The reason is quite interesting but concerns
the nature of the exception flow analysis. The exception flow analysis has two
Datalog rules whose head tuples (i.e., the consequent tuples) may potentially
have a large number of disjuncts when the rules are instantiated. Consider
an instantiation where all the disjuncts of a particular (head) tuple, have the
minimum probability Pmin . In spite of all disjuncts having the minimum probability Pmin , the sheer number of disjuncts will cause the probability of the
head tuple to be fairly high (intuitively, if a tuple t can be derived either by an
instantiated rule r1 or by an instantiated rule r2 , then the probability that tuple
t is derivable will be greater than or equal to the larger of: (a) the probability
that rule r1 is applicable, and (b) the probability that rule r2 is applicable).
The high probability of the head tuple gets propagated along an exception
flow path and may eventually result in a false alarm getting assigned a high
probability, which in turn adversely affects ranking. This effect is exacerbated
when the value of Pmin itself is high (like 0.5 or 0.4). These two rules of the
exception flow analysis cause the benchmarks to be particularly sensitive to the
value of Pmin .
3. Benchmarks AsyncJobDispatcher and HtmlSanitizer are slightly sensitive to
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the maximum tuple probability Pmax . The AUC of benchmark HtmlSanitizer
worsens a little, and the AUC of benchmark AsyncJobDispatcher improves
a little, when Pmax changes from 0.999 to 0.985. But, on the whole, the
benchmarks are not sensitive to the value of Pmax . For a range of values of
Pmax going from 0.995 down to 0.975, the AUCs remained steady when Pmax
was decremented in steps of 0.005.

4.4.4

Impact of Optimization on Scalability

In this section, we examine the impact optimization has on Presto’s ability to scale
to larger programs. Tables 4.13 and 4.14 give the measurements.
With optimization turned on, there is a tremendous reduction in the size of the
Bayesian network, and a corresponding reduction in the time required to construct
the Bayesian network and perform marginal inference. Similarly, there is also great
reduction in the number of runs of the dynamic analysis required, and correspondingly
in the dynamic analysis time. Therefore optimizations to reduce the size of the
Bayesian network are critical for the scalability of Presto.
However, observe that the dynamic analysis time dominates the overall end-to-end
time taken by Presto for any benchmark. Section 4.3.4 discusses some options for
alleviating this bottleneck.
Table 4.13: Scalability metrics for ranking with and without optimizations. #Clauses
and #Tuples specify the size of the Bayesian network. Ranking time includes the
time for constructing the Bayesian network from a derivation graph, and the time for
performing marginal inference.
Program
AsyncJobDispatcher
AsyncWebCrawler
FilePkgUtil
HtmlSanitizer
ScrambledSquares
AsyncWaveformGenerator

With optimization
#Clauses #Tuples Ranking
(K)
(K)
time(s)
1.1
1.5
2.5
0.7
0.9
1.5
1.8
2.5
4.0
2.5
2.4
6.0
1.0
1.3
2.0
0.7
1.1
2.0
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Without optimization
#Clauses #Tuples Ranking
(K)
(K)
time(s)
54.8
108.6
157
42.6
84.6
122
168.5
335.7
472
65.6
128.4
185
45.5
90.2
130
74.6
148.8
211

Table 4.14: Scalability metrics for dynamic analysis with and without optimizations.
Dynamic analysis time includes the time for generating dynamic analysis configurations, executing the dynamic analysis, and extracting probabilities from the dynamic
analysis logs. Dynamic analysis runs gives the number times the dynamic analysis
was run (each time with a different configuration).
Program
AsyncJobDispatcher
AsyncWebCrawler
FilePkgUtil
HtmlSanitizer
ScrambledSquares
AsyncWaveformGenerator

4.5

With optimization
Dyn analysis Dyn analysis
runs
time(m)
100
8.0
72
6.0
135
3.5
86
7.0
34
2.5
59
5.5

Without optimization
Dyn analysis Dyn analysis
runs
time(m)
1107
95.5
821
71.5
1299
33.5
1937
178.5
2725
200.0
1142
121.5

Analysis of Alarm Ranking

Stopping criterion. Given a ranking of alarms by their probability of being true
bugs, it is not clear how many of the top-ranked alarms we should inspect. One
alternative is to stop inspecting alarms when the probability of an alarm drops below
some threshold value. Another alternative is to stop when the budget for alarm
inspection is exhausted, which could happen in practical scenarios. To guarantee
soundness, all the alarms still need to be inspected. In spite of this, our tool will be
valuable in practice.
Quality of ranking. As we have seen in the earlier sections, the ranking produced
in each interaction of Bingo, and by Presto, ranks alarms from the most highly
probable to the least. We enquire into the quality of ranking with the following
question: How good is an ordering of alarms, w = a1 , a2 , . . . , an , in light of their
associated ground truths, v1 , v2 , . . . , vn ?
We use the number of inversions as a measure of ranking quality. A pair of alarms
(ai , aj ) from w forms an inversion if ai appears before aj , but ai is false and aj is true,
i.e., i < j ∧ ¬vi ∧ vj . The ranker incurs a penalty for each inversion, because it has
presented a false alarm before a real bug. Well ordered sequences of alarms usually
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have fewer inversions than poorly ordered sequences. We write χ(w) for the number
of inversions in w.
Assume now that Pr(·) describes the joint probability distribution of alarms. We
seek the ordering of alarms with lowest expected inversion count. The following
theorem states that the ranking produced by Bingo and Presto is optimal for
alarm ranking given a fixed set of observations e.
Theorem 4.5.1. For each set of observations e, the sequence w = a1 , a2 , . . . , an
of alarms, arranged according to decreasing Pr(ai | e), has the minimum expected
inversion count over all potential orderings w0 .
Let w = a1 , a2 , . . . , an be a sequence of alarms. If nt and nf are the number of
true and false alarms in w, then observe that for a perfect ranking wg , with all true
alarms before all false positives, χ(wg ) = 0, whereas an ordering wb with all false
positives before all true alarms, has χ(wb ) = nf nt .
Next, if Pr(·) describes the joint probability distribution of alarms, observe that
the expected inversion count of w = a1 , a2 , . . . , an of alarms is given by:
E(χ(w) | e) =

XX
i

Pr(¬ai ∧ aj | e).

(4.2)

j>i

We can now prove the above theorem.
Proof. We will first prove the theorem for the case with n = 2 alarms, and then
generalize to larger values of n.
Case 1 (n = 2). There are exactly two ways of arranging a pair of alarms: w =
a1 , a2 , and w0 = a2 , a1 , with expected inversion counts
E(χ(w) | e) = Pr(¬a1 ∧ a2 | e), and
E(χ(w0 ) | e) = Pr(a1 ∧ ¬a2 | e)
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respectively. Our hypothesis states that
Pr(a1 | e) ≥ Pr(a2 | e).
Rewriting each of these events as the union of a pair of mutually exclusive events, we
have:
Pr(a1 ∧ a2 | e) + Pr(a1 ∧ ¬a2 | e)
≥ Pr(a1 ∧ a2 | e) + Pr(¬a1 ∧ a2 | e),
so that E(χ(w0 | e)) ≥ E(χ(w | e)), thus establishing our result for the case when
n = 2.
Case 2 (n > 2). We will now prove the result for larger values of n by piggy-backing
on bubble sort. For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that some other sequence
w0 = a01 , a02 , . . . , a0n has lower expected inversion count,
(4.3)

E(χ(w0 | e)) < E(χ(w) | e).

Associate each alarm a0i with its index j in the reference ordering w, so that a0i = aj ,
and run bubble sort on w0 according to the newly associated keys. For each k, let
w(k) be the state of the sequence after the sorting algorithm has swapped k elements,
so that we end up with a sequence of orderings, w(0) , w(1) , w(2) , . . . , w(m) , such that
w0 = w(0) and w(m) = w.
Now consider each pair of consecutive sequences, w(k) and w(k+1) . Except for a
(k)

(k)

pair of adjacent elements, ai , ai+1 , the two sequence have the same alarms at all
(k)

(k)

other locations. Because they were swapped, it follows that ai+1 appears before ai
in w(m) = w, so that
(k)

(k)

Pr(ai+1 | e) ≥ Pr(ai
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| e).

From Equation 4.2 and by an argument similar to that used in the n = 2 case, we
conclude that E(χ(w(k) ) | e) ≥ E(χ(w(k+1) ) | e), and transitively that E(χ(w(0) ) |
e) ≥ E(χ(w(m) ) | e). Since w0 = w(0) and w(m) = w, this immediately conflicts with
our assumption that E(χ(w0 | e)) < E(χ(w) | e), and completes the proof.
Another version of this problem which is relevant for Bingo is the alarm ranking
in the interactive setting, where e grows with each iteration. This is referring to a
“dynamic” ranking of alarms i.e., the sequence of alarms proposed by the interaction
model of Bingo to the user. Each alarm in this sequence is the top-ranked one in
the alarm ranking produced in each interaction. By choosing a top-ranked alarm
during each interaction, Bingo is employing a greedy heuristic. A different strategy
for choosing an alarm for inspection during each interaction may potentially yield
a better “dynamic” ranking. But finding an optimal strategy in such a setting is a
significantly harder problem and one that we do not explore here.
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Chapter 5
A Study of Cycle Elimination
In this chapter, we discuss three approaches to eliminate cycles from the derivation
graph. Let GC be the set of instantiated constraints comprising the derivation graph.
We wish to capture as many probabilistic dependencies of the alarm tuples as possible.
One heuristic approach to do this is to construct the Bayesian network from the
largest set of clauses GCc ⊆ GC that induces an acyclic derivation graph. By largest,
we mean that the cardinality of GCc should be as high as possible. Finding the largest
subset of acyclic clauses GCc can be shown to be NP-complete by reduction from
the maximum acyclic subgraph problem [27]. Therefore, we propose three approaches
that relax the “maximum” condition to different extents. We still require every tuple
that was derivable in GC to be derivable in GCc .
The first approach (Section 5.2) constructs GCc by aggressively removing every
clause from GC that derives a tuple that has already been derived “earlier”. The
second approach (Section 5.3) tries to put each clause discarded by the aggressive
algorithm, back into GCc as long as GCc induces an acyclic graph. The order in which
the discarded clauses are put back into GCc affects the cardinality of GCc . Section 5.3
discusses this issue in more detail. The third approach(Section 5.4) transforms GC
into a set of clauses GCdtcov that induces an acyclic graph, while retaining more
derivation trees for each tuple than the previous two approaches. Intuitively, for each
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clause discarded by the second approach, it inserts one or more new clauses to retain
the derivation trees that comprise the discarded clause, while maintaining acyclicity.

5.1

Notation and Definitions

This section recapitulates all the notation we have used thus far, and states a few
definitions. We will use this notation in the following sections.
I : The set of all input tuples.
C : The set of all derived tuples.
T : The set of all tuples. T = I ∪ C.
GC : The set of all grounded constraints.
cg : The consequent tuple of the grounded constraint g ∈ GC.
Ag : The set of all antecedent tuples of the grounded constraint g ∈ GC.
G(T, GC) : The derivation graph induced by the set of tuples T and the set of
grounded constraints GC.
Definition 5.1.1 (Tuples of a set of clauses). tuples(g) = Ag ∪ {cg } where g is a
grounded constraint. tuples(GC 0 ) = ∪g∈GC 0 tuples(g) where GC 0 is a set of grounded
constraints.
Definition 5.1.2 (Cycle in a set of clauses). A sequence of grounded constraints
g1 , g2 , . . . , gn , ∀gi ∈ GC 0 where 1 ≤ i ≤ n and GC 0 is any set of clauses, forms a cycle
if (a) cgi ∈ Agi+1 where 1 ≤ i < n, and (b) cgn ∈ Ag1 .

5.2

Aggressive Cycle Elimination

The aggressive cycle elimination algorithm shown in Algorithm 4 is a modified version
of the naive Datalog evaluator. For each tuple, it assigns an integer time stamp
that captures the number of derivation steps required to derive it, starting from the
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input tuples. The input tuples are assigned a time stamp of zero. All derived tuples
derivable from only input tuples, get a time stamp of one, and so on. A clause in
GC that derives a tuple that has already been derived, is not included in GCc . Note
that it is possible for more than one clause to derive a tuple not derived earlier. This
property ensures the acyclicity of the derivation graph induced by GCc .
Algorithm 4 CycleElimAggressive(I, C, GC), where I is the set of all input
tuples, C is the set of all derived tuples, and GC is a set of grounded constraints. It
returns GCc ⊆ GC, where the set of clauses GCc induces an acyclic derivation graph.
1. Initialize the timestamp map T S where T S : (I ∪ C) → N∞ , such that for each
tuple t, if t ∈ I, T S(t) = 0, and otherwise, T S(t) = ∞.
2. While there exists a clause g such that
T S(cg ) > max(T S(a)) + 1, update:
a∈Ag

T S(cg ) := max(T S(a)) + 1.
a∈Ag

(5.1)

3. Define GCc = {g ∈ GC | T S(cg ) > maxa∈Ag (T S(a))}. GCc ⊆ GC is the set of all
those clauses in GC whose consequent has a timestamp strictly greater than all of
its antecedents.
4. Return GCc .

Theorem 5.2.1. For all I, C and GC, if GCc = CycleElimAggressive(I, C, GC),
then (a) GCc ⊆ GC, (b) every tuple derivable using GC is also derivable using GCc ,
and (c) GCc is acyclic.
Proof. The first part of the claim is immediate because of the definition of GCc in
Algorithm 4.
We will now prove the second part of the claim. If t is an input tuple, then the
result is immediate, because of the presence of the clause True =⇒ t in GCc . We
now consider the derivability of tuple t, which is not an input tuple. At the fixpoint
of step 2 of the algorithm, every derivable tuple t has a finite-valued timestamp,
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T S(t)

∞. We prove the derivability of t in GCc by induction on its timestamp

T S(t). We already know the result for the case of T S(t) = 0, as t is then an input
tuple. If T S(t) = n + 1, and assuming the result for all tuples t0 with T S(t0 ) ≤ n,
consider the deriving clause gt , and observe that each of its antecedents t00 ∈ Agt
has a timestamp, T S(t00 ) ≤ n. By the induction hypothesis, all these tuples t00 are
derivable, and it follows that t is itself derivable within GCc .
Finally, observe that for every clause g ∈ GCc , the timestamp of the consequent
T S(cg ) is strictly greater than the timestamp of each of its antecedents, T S(a), for
a ∈ Ag . This rules out the possibility of a cycle in GCc .

5.3

DFS-based Cycle Elimination

In this section we propose a DFS-based approach as shown in Algorithm 5, to
eliminate cycles from GC, the set of all grounded constraints. The algorithm initially
executes steps 1 to 3 in the same manner as Algorithm 4 to compute the set of
“forward” clauses GCf wd , and the set of “backward” clauses GCbkwd . Next, it initializes
the acyclic set of clauses GCc to the set of forward clauses. Then, in steps 6 and 7,
it tries to add each clause from the set of backward clauses to GCc , if the addition
of the clause maintains the acyclicity of GCc . The acyclicity check in step 7(b)
executes the standard DFS-based cycle detection algorithm[19] for directed graphs.
The correctness of algorithm 5 immediately follows from the theorem below.
Theorem 5.3.1. A set of clauses GC 0 contains a cycle iff the directed graph G =
(V, E) constructed from GC 0 with V = tuples(GC 0 ) and E = {(v1 , v2 ) | v1 ∈ Ag ∧v2 =
cg where g ∈ GC 0 }, contains a cycle.
Proof. Let GC 0 be some set of clauses containing a cycle. Then by definition, there is
a sequence of clauses g1 , . . . , gn such that cgi ∈ Agi+1 where 1 ≤ i < n, and cgn ∈ Ag1 .
By the rules of construction for the directed graph G = (V, E), there is a directed
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edge from cgn to cg1 , cg1 to cg2 , and so on up to cgn−1 to cgn . These edges form a cycle
in G = (V, E).
If there is a directed cycle in graph G = (V, E), then we know that there is a
path with directed edges (v1 , v2 ), (v2 , v3 ), . . . , (vn−1 , vn ), (vn , v1 ) where 1 < n < | V |.
By the rules of construction for graph G = (V, E), for every directed edge (vi , vj ) in
this path, there is at least one grounded constraint gi ∈ GC 0 where tuple vi ∈ Agi
and tuple vj = cgi . The sequence of grounded constraints g1 , g2 , . . . , gn form a cycle
in GC 0 .
However, it is possible that | GCc | might vary depending on the order in which
the clauses in GCbkwd are processed in steps 6 and 7. We can have variants of this
algorithm, each with a different heuristic to compute the order in which the clauses in
GCbkwd are processed. But our focus will be to explore ways to retain the derivation
trees that affect the computation of the probability of a tuple in the resulting Bayesian
network (discussed in Section 5.4).

5.4

DT-covering Cycle Elimination

The problem with the previous two approaches is that we lose derivation trees when
we discard clauses to make the set of all clauses GC acyclic. If we lose a derivation
tree for tuple t ∈ T (the set of all tuples), then the computation of Pr(t) (that is,
the probability that tuple t is derivable) is more approximate than if we did not lose
it. Intuitively, the reason is that a tuple t is not derivable by the analysis only if
none of the derivation trees for t derive it. This means that we need to track all the
derivation trees for a tuple t in order to determine the probability of tuple t being
derivable. We first formally define the probability Pr(t) of a tuple t being derivable,
as the probability of an event that contains all possible outcomes in a probability
space, in which the tuple t is derivable. Next, we express Pr(t) for a tuple t in terms
of the derivation trees that derive it.
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Algorithm 5 CycleElimDfs(I, C, GC), where I is the set of all input tuples, C
is the set of all derived tuples, and GC is a set of grounded constraints. It returns
GCc ⊆ GC, where the set of clauses GCc induces an acyclic derivation graph.
1. Initialize the timestamp map T S where T S : (I ∪ C) → N∞ , such that for each
tuple t, if t ∈ I, T S(t) = 0, and otherwise, T S(t) = ∞.
2. While there exists a clause g such that
T S(cg ) > max(T S(a)) + 1, update:
a∈Ag

T S(cg ) := max(T S(a)) + 1.
a∈Ag

(5.2)

3. Define GCf wd = {g ∈ GC | T S(cg ) > maxa∈Ag (T S(a))}. GCf wd ⊆ GC is the set
of all those clauses in GC whose consequent has a timestamp strictly greater than
all of its antecedents.
4. Define GCbkwd = {g ∈ GC | T S(cg ) ≤ T S(a), for some a ∈ Ag }. GCbkwd ⊆ GC is
the set of all those clauses in GC whose consequent has a timestamp less than or
equal to that of at least one of its antecedents.
5. Initialize GCc = GCf wd .
6. Construct a directed graph G = (V, E) from GCf wd with
V = tuples(GCf wd ), and
E = {(v1 , v2 ) | v1 ∈ Ag ∧ v2 = cg where g ∈ GCf wd }.
7. For each clause g ∈ GCbkwd :
(a) Construct a directed graph G0 = (V 0 , E 0 ) where V 0 = V ∪ tuples(g) and
E 0 = E ∪ {(a, cg ) | a ∈ Ag }.
(b) If IsAcyclic(G0 ):
i. Update G = G0 .
ii. Update GCc = GCc ∪ {g}.
8. Return GCc .
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As we have seen before, the computation model to compute Pr(t) for a tuple
t is a Bayesian network extracted from the derivation graph induced by the set of
clauses GC. To be able to extract a Bayesian network, we need to eliminate cycles
from GC. We consider the problem of not losing derivation trees for a tuple t ∈ T .
In general, a tuple might have infinite derivation trees. So we define for each tuple
t ∈ T , the notion of a finite set of contributing derivation trees that is equal to or a
subset of all possible derivation trees for tuple t. We show that the contributing set
of derivation trees for tuple t is sufficient to compute the probability Pr(t) as defined
in Section 5.4.1. Based on this theory, we derive a technique to eliminate cycles while
preserving at least the contributing derivation trees, for a tuple t ∈ T .
This approach entails a transformation of the set of clauses GC to another set of
clauses GCdtcov . This transformation should ensure that (a) all the tuples derivable
in GC are derivable in GCdtcov (b) GCdtcov induces an acyclic derivation graph, and
(c) for each tuple t ∈ T , at least a contributing set of derivation trees in GC, is
retained in GCdtcov .
Section 5.4.1 builds up the necessary theory and Section 5.4.2 presents the
algorithm that achieves the transformation of GC to GCdtcov as specified above.

5.4.1

Underlying Theory

When an analysis is applied to a program, the analysis conclusions are incomplete:
not all conclusions hold true in the ground truth. Since we have no way of knowing
the ground truth, we consider a probabilistic model associated with the analysis such
that given probabilistic assumptions about the input to the analysis and the rules of
the analysis, we can infer corresponding probabilities for the analysis conclusions.
Our approach is inspired by probabilistic databases [76]. We postulate that the
presence of input tuples and of the grounded instances of the constraints is associated
with a probability and that these events are mutually independent. In particular,
for each constraint r there is a number wr where 0 ≤ wr ≤ 1, such that the use in
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execution of every grounded instance of the constraint has the probability wr . If
there are n grounded constraints (including input tuples) in GC, then our probability
space has 2n possible worlds or outcomes. In each world, each grounded constraint
g ∈ GC is either in (in other words, it “fires”) or out. Therefore, the probability of
Q
Q
each world W is g∈W wr . g6∈W (1 − wr ) where r is the constraint corresponding to
the grounded constraint g.
Definition 5.4.1 (Probability Space). Our probability space is the pair (Ω, P ) where
the sample space Ω is the set of all possible outcomes. It is the set of subsets of GC
where each subset represents the grounded constraints reached by the execution of
the Datalog analysis. If n is the number of grounded constraints, then | Ω |= 2n . The
function P : Ω → [0, 1] assigns probabilities to each outcome.
Definition 5.4.2 (Derivation Tree). A derivation tree τ for a tuple t in T is a labelled
tree in which: (a) each vertex of the tree is labelled by one tuple, (b) the root is
labelled by t, (c) the leaves are labelled by tuples in I, (d) each internal vertex is
labelled by tuple th and its children are respectively labelled by tuples t1 , t2 , . . . , tn if
the grounded constraint t1 ∧ t2 ∧ . . . ∧ tn =⇒ th ∈ GC. We say that a node of a
derivation tree represents a grounded constraint g if it is labelled by the consequent
tuple of g, and its children are labelled by the antecedent tuples of g. We define
nodes(τ ) to be the set of nodes of the derivation tree τ .
Definition 5.4.3 (Clauses of a Derivation Tree). Let τ be a derivation tree. Define
gc(τ ) = {g | g ∈ GC, g is of the form t1 ∧ t2 ∧ . . . ∧ tn =⇒ th , and τ has an internal
node labelled th with its children labelled t1 through tn }. Thus, gc(τ ) is the set of all
grounded constraints used in the derivation tree τ .
We are interested in the following kinds of events over the sample space Ω:
1. kg : The event that comprises all outcomes from the sample space Ω in which
the grounded constraint g fires. We define P (kg ) = wr .
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2. kτ : The event that comprises all outcomes from the sample space Ω in which
the derivation tree τ “fires”. For the derivation tree τ to fire, all the grounded
T
constraints from gc(τ ) must fire. Therefore, kτ = g ∈ gc(τ ) kg and P (kτ ) =
Q
g ∈ gc(τ ) P (kg ).
3. kt : The event that comprises all outcomes from the sample space Ω in which
tuple t is derivable. A tuple t is derivable if at least one derivation tree deriving
S
T
it, fires. Therefore, kt = τ derives t g ∈ gc(τ ) kg . We need to compute P (kt ).
With each of the above events, we associate a boolean random variable. Let the
random variable Xg represent the event kg , the random variable Xτ represent the
event kτ , and the random variable Xt represent the event kt . Then:
Xg : Ω → {true, f alse} where ∀o, Xg (o) = true if o ∈ kg , f alse otherwise.
Xτ : Ω → {true, f alse} where ∀o, Xτ (o) = true if o ∈ kτ , f alse otherwise.
Xt : Ω → {true, f alse} where ∀o, Xt (o) = true if o ∈ kt , f alse otherwise.
The shorthand notation for P ({o | Xt (o) = true}) is Pr(t). We similarly define Pr(g)
and Pr(τ ).
Next, we define the contributing set of derivation trees that we have motivated
earlier.
Definition 5.4.4 (Contributing Set of Derivation Trees). A set of derivation trees
R = {τ1 , τ2 , . . . , τn } for a tuple t ∈ T is said to be a contributing set if
(Incomparability) ∀τ, τ 0 ∈ R, gc(τ ) * gc(τ 0 ),
(Exhaustivity) ∀τ s.t. τ derives t, τ 6∈ R =⇒ ∃τ 0 ∈ R s.t. gc(τ 0 ) ⊆ gc(τ ), and
(Minimality) ∀τ s.t. τ derives t, τ 6∈ R =⇒ ∃τ 0 ∈ R s.t. gc(τ 0 ) = gc(τ ) =⇒
| nodes(τ 0 ) | ≤ | nodes(τ ) | .

Lemma 5.4.1. A contributing set of derivation trees for a tuple t is finite.
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Proof. It is clear from the definition of the contributing set of derivation trees that for
any pair of trees τ and τ 0 belonging to it, gc(τ ) 6= gc(τ 0 ). Since the set of grounded
constraints GC is finite, the number of distinct subsets of GC is finite and equal to
2|GC| . The size of a contributing set is at most 2|GC| .
The lemma below states that the set of outcomes from the sample space Ω,
represented by the contributing derivation trees for a tuple t, contains all outcomes
from Ω in which tuple t is derivable. Therefore, retaining at least the contributing
derivation trees from the set of clauses GC, in the transformed set of clauses GCdtcov
is sufficient to compute Pr(t).
Lemma 5.4.2. For any tuple t, let R be its contributing set of derivation trees. Then,
S
S
τ derives t kτ =
τ ∈R kτ .
Proof. Let R = {τ1 , τ2 , . . . , τn } be a contributing set of derivation trees for tuple t.
Let τ be a derivation tree for tuple t s.t. τ 6∈ R. Then by definition of the contributing
set, ∃τ 0 ∈ R s.t. gc(τ 0 ) ⊆ gc(τ ). Now, kτ 0 is the set of all outcomes from the sample
space Ω in which the grounded constraints in gc(τ 0 ) have fired. Since gc(τ ) contains
all the grounded constraints of τ 0 and maybe more, the outcomes in which all of gc(τ )
fire will be a subset of kτ 0 . That is, kτ 0 ⊇ kτ . Therefore, kτ 0 ∪ kτ = kτ 0 . Since this
holds for any derivation tree τ for tuple t that is not in R, the lemma follows.
The lemma below formally states and proves the following statement: if a derivation tree for tuple t uses all the clauses forming a cycle along one of its paths, then it
cannot be a contributing derivation tree for t.
Lemma 5.4.3. Let g1 , g2 , . . . , gm be a sequence of clauses that forms a cycle, where
each gi , 1 ≤ i ≤ m belongs to the set of grounded constraints GC. A derivation
tree τ for tuple t, that has a path p with a sequence of nodes that successively represent gi , gi−1 , gi−2 , . . . , g1 , gm , gm−1 , . . . , gi+1 where 1 ≤ i ≤ m, is not a contributing
derivation tree for tuple t.
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Proof. Let the sequence of nodes on path p that represent clauses gi , gi−1 , gi−2 , . . . , g1 ,
gm , gm−1 , . . . , gi+1 , be ni , ni−1 , ni−2 , . . . , n1 , nm , nm−1 , . . . , ni+1 . As clauses gi , . . . gi+1
form a cycle, one of the antecedent tuples of the clause gi+1 is tuple cgi . Let n be the
node representing this tuple, with s as the subtree rooted at n. We construct a derivation tree τ 0 from derivation tree τ by deleting the nodes ni−1 , ni−2 , . . . , n1 , nm , nm−1 ,
. . . , ni+1 , and the node n on path p. Next, we make the children of the root of subtree
s as the children of node ni in derivation tree τ 0 . Note that the root of subtree s
and node ni are labelled by the same tuple. Thus, gc(τ 0 ) ⊆ gc(τ ). Both τ and τ 0 are
derivation trees for tuple t. Moreover, we will delete at least one node from derivation
tree τ to form derivation tree τ 0 because at least one clause is required to form a cycle
that will result in at least two nodes on path p. Therefore, by the incomparability and
minimality conditions, the derivation tree τ can never be a contributing derivation
tree for tuple t.
Next, we develop a succinct representation for all the derivation trees of a tuple
in the set of grounded constraints GC. Our representation is motivated by the study
of provenance polynomials in databases [31]. This representation is used by the
algorithm given in the next section to keep track of all the derivation trees for a
tuple. In order to treat input and derived tuples uniformly, we augment GC with
one constraint for each input tuple: ge : true =⇒ e where e ∈ I.
Let (K, +, ., 0K , 1K ) be a commutative semiring where each element of K is a
|GC|

set of sets of grounded constraints. Therefore, | K |= 22

. Let k1 and k2 be two

elements of K. We define the operations of + and . as follows:
Operator + is the global union, therefore, k1 + k2 = k1 ∪ k2 .
Operator . is pairwise union, therefore, k1 .k2 = {e1 ∪ e2 | e1 ∈ k1 ∧ e2 ∈ k2 }
The additive and multiplicative identities are: 0K = {} and 1K = {{}}. We denote an
element of K as a sum of terms. For example, an element {{g1 , g2 }, {g3 , g4 }, {g5 }} of
K is denoted as g1 g2 + g3 g4 + g5 .
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We use the elements of the commutative semiring K to succinctly represent
derivation trees of a tuple, as a sum of terms. Each term represents a derivation
tree τ by the set gc(τ ). For example, let a tuple have three derivation trees τ1 , τ2 ,
and τ3 , where gc(τ1 ) = {g1 , g2 }, gc(τ2 ) = {g3 , g4 }, and gc(τ3 ) = {g5 }. Then the
element of K that represents all the above three derivation trees, is g1 g2 + g3 g4 + g5 .
This representation is succinct because the operations of the semiring K fuse the
representations of two distinct derivation trees into one, if they comprise the same
set of clauses.
Next, we define the notion of a polynomial over the semiring K. We need this to
represent the derivation tree of a tuple in terms of derivation trees of other tuples. A
polynomial in our setting, is an expression over a set of variables X = {xt1 , xt2 , . . .}.
Each variable xti that may occur in a polynomial, is associated with the tuple ti ∈ T ,
and represents all the derivation trees for the tuple ti . Therefore, there are | T |
variables, one for each tuple in T , where T is the set of all tuples. Now, we can
express a derivation tree for a tuple t as a polynomial over the variables corresponding
to the antecedent tuples of t, in that derivation tree. We illustrate with an example.
Let g1 : t1 ∧ t2 =⇒ t and g2 : t3 =⇒ t be two ways in which we can derive tuple
t. Here, clauses g1 , g2 ∈ GC, tuple t ∈ C, and tuples t1 , t2 , t3 ∈ T . We represent
the derivation trees for tuple t by the variable xt , for tuple t1 by variable xt1 and
so on. The polynomial for xt is expressed in terms of variables xt1 , xt2 and xt3
as follows: xt = g1 xt1 xt2 + g2 xt3 . We say that the term g1 xt1 xt2 represents the
grounded constraint g1 , the term g2 xt3 represents the grounded constraint g2 , and
the polynomial expression g1 xt1 xt2 + g2 xt3 represents the grounded constraints that
derive tuple t. Note that if a term in a polynomial expression has variables, then it
represents multiple derivation trees each comprising a distinct set of clauses.
Definition 5.4.5 (Terms of a Polynomial Expression). Let expr be a polynomial
expression over the semiring K. Define terms(expr) = {trm | trm is a term in the
polynomial expression expr}.
84

Definition 5.4.6 (Substitution in a Polynomial Expression). For any tuple t ∈ T ,
let exprt denote the polynomial expression that represents the grounded constraints
that derive tuple t. Let pp be any polynomial expression, one of whose terms refers
to the variable xt for some tuple t. Let newpp be the polynomial expression got by
substituting exprt for variable xt in pp. We denote this action of substituting for
all occurrences of one variable in pp, as pp ⇒ newpp. The action of substituting for
zero or more variables, one after the other in sequence, is denoted by pp ⇒∗ newpp0 ,
where newpp0 is a polynomial expression.
Thus, performing one or more substitutions on a polynomial expression that
represents all the derivation trees of a tuple t, will yield us a different polynomial
expression that still represents all the derivation trees of tuple t. Therefore, the
general form of a term is: g1 . . . gn xt1 . . . xtm . Just as we illustrated how a term
of a polynomial can be constructed from a clause, we define the inverse operation
of extracting a clause from a term of a polynomial expression that represents the
derivation trees of a tuple.
Definition 5.4.7 (Clause Corresponding to a Term in a Polynomial Expression). Let
trm be a term in the polynomial expression that represents the grounded constraints
that derive tuple t, for any tuple t ∈ T . Define get_clause(trm) = t1 ∧. . .∧tm =⇒ t
where trm = g1 . . . gn xt1 . . . xtm .
Lemma 5.4.4. For any tuple t ∈ T , let exprt denote the polynomial expression that
represents the grounded constraints that derive tuple t. If exprt ⇒∗ exprt0 , and there is
a term in exprt0 that refers to the variable xt , then that term represents the derivation
trees for tuple t that have a cycle in one of their paths.
Proof. Let exprt denote the polynomial that represents the grounded constraints that
derive tuple t.
Case 1. Let exprt ⇒∗ exprt0 with zero substitutions, so exprt = exprt0 . Let exprt
contain the term g. . . . .xt . . . ., where the grounded constraint g ∈ GC. Then, clause
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g has the form . . . ∧ t ∧ . . . =⇒ t. This term represents derivation trees for tuple
t whose root node is labelled by tuple t. The child nodes of the root node will be
labelled by tuples in Ag , one of which is tuple t. The path from the root node to the
child node labelled by tuple t, in each of these derivation trees, represents the cycle
formed by the clause g.
Case 2. Let exprt ⇒∗ exprt0 with one or more substitutions. Let the sequence
exprt1 , . . . , exprtn be the polynomial expressions after each substitution, with exprt =
exprt1 and exprtn = exprt0 . By definition of the substitution operation, for each
1 ≤ i < n, exprti+1 is got by substituting for some variable xti occurring in a term of
exprti . Again, by definition, variable xti is substituted by the polynomial expression
that represents the grounded constraints that derive tuple ti . We know that exprtn
contains some term that refers to variable xt . So, there must be a sequence of clauses
g1 , . . . , gn such that tuple ti = cgi and tuple ti+1 ∈ Agi , for 1 ≤ i < n, and where tuple
tn = t = cgn . Also, there must be some clause g ∈ GC where tuple t = cg and tuple
t1 ∈ Ag because exprt1 is the polynomial expression that represents the grounded
constraints that derive tuple t. Therefore, the sequence of clauses g, g1 , . . . , gn form
a cycle. Let termg be the term in exprt1 that represents the grounded constraint g.
Since the derivation tree has an edge from a node representing a consequent tuple to
a node representing an antecedent tuple, the derivation trees represented by termg
have a path that represents the cycle caused by clauses g, g1 , . . . , gn .
Definition 5.4.8 (DFS Descendants). Let the set of clauses GC induce the directed
graph G = (V, E) where V = tuples(GC) and E = {(v1 , v2 ) | v1 ∈ Ag ∧ v2 =
cg where g ∈ GC}. Further, let ds be the set of trees resulting from a depth first
traversal of graph G. For any tuple t ∈ tuples(GC), define df s_descendants(t) =
{t0 | t0 is a vertex in the subtree rooted at t, within some tree in ds}.
We note that the depth first traversal of a graph, initiated at different sets of root
nodes, may yield different sets of depth first trees. We have elided this level of detail
in order to keep the notation simple. The above definition of df s_descendants is
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with respect to a given depth first traversal.
Note that if a sequence of grounded constraints g1 , g2 , . . . , gn ∈ GC form a cycle,
and if some tuple t is the earliest tuple among tuples({g1 , . . . , gn }) to be visited by a
depth first traversal of graph G induced by GC, then by the property of depth first
traversal, tuples({g1 , . . . , gn }) \ {t} ⊆ df s_descendants(t). Moreover, if a different
tuple t0 ∈ tuples({g1 , . . . , gn }) happens to be the earliest tuple visited by a different
depth first traversal, then all the remaining tuples (tuples({g1 , . . . , gn })\{t0 }) will still
belong to df s_descendants(t0 ) as determined by the different depth first traversal.
Lemma 5.4.5. For each tuple t ∈ T , let exprt denote the polynomial expression
that represents the derivation trees of tuple t. Let df s_descendants(t) be the DFS
descendants in a depth first traversal of the graph G induced by the set of clauses
GC. For each tuple t ∈ T , let exprt ⇒∗ exprt0 s.t. all the terms in exprt0 do not refer
to a variable that corresponds to any tuple ∈ df s_descendants(t). Define GC 0 =
{g | g = get_clause(trm) where trm ∈ terms(exprt0 ) ∧ trm does not refer to xt ,
∀t ∈ T }. Then, GC 0 is acyclic.
Proof. To see this, consider any term trm, which contributes a clause to GC 0 , and
which occurs in the polynomial expression exprt0 for some tuple t. Let xt0 be a
variable referred to in trm. By the conditions stated in the Lemma, t0 6= t and
t0 ∈
/ df s_descendants(t). It is evident from the rules of construction of a polynomial
expression for a tuple, and from the definition of ⇒∗ that tuple t0 derives tuple t in
GC 0 . We show that GC 0 is acyclic by showing that tuple t cannot derive tuple t0 in
GC 0 . We prove this by contradiction.
Assume that tuple t derives tuple t0 . We know that t0 ∈
/ df s_descendants(t).
This implies that t0 must have been visited earlier than t in the depth first traversal.
Putting this fact together with the fact that t0 derives t, we conclude that t0 must be
an ancestor of t in the depth first traversal. In other words, t ∈ df s_descendants(t0 ).
By the pre-conditions of the lemma, there will be no term in the polynomial expression
for tuple t0 in which variable xt will occur. A similar argument as above leads us to
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conclude that t must be an ancestor of t0 , which leads to a contradiction. Therefore,
it is not possible that tuple t derives tuple t0 , which implies that there is no cycle
involving tuples t and t0 .
Algorithm 6 CycleElimDTCovering(GC, W, I, C), where GC is the set of
clauses and W is a function that associates each clause to its probability. I and C
are the sets of input and derived tuples. It returns GCdtcov , the new set of clauses
got by transforming GC, and the probabilities Wdtcov for clauses in GCdtcov .
1. Initialize P P (t) = 0K , ∀t ∈ (I ∪ C) where P P : C → polynomials over K.
2. For each grounded constraint g : t1 ∧ . . . ∧ tn =⇒ th ∈ GC, update:
P P (th ) = P P (th ) + g.xt1 .xt2 . . . . .xtn .

(5.3)

3. Initialize roots = {cg |Ag ⊆ I ∧ g ∈ GC}. The set roots contains the tuples that
are directly derivable from input tuples.
4. Initialize visited(t) = f alse, ∀t ∈ C where visited : C → {true, f alse}.
5. While there is a tuple t ∈ roots such that visited(t) = f alse, call UpdatePP(t).
6. Initialize GCdtcov = {}. GCdtcov is the new set of grounded constraints that is
populated in the next step.
7. For each tuple t ∈ C, do:
For each term g1 .g2 . . . . .gn .xt1 . . . . .xtk in P P (t), execute the following steps.
a. Update GCdtcov = GCdtcov ∪ g 0 where g 0 : t1 ∧ . . . ∧ tk =⇒ t. In effect,
g 0 is the constraint got by merging constraints g1 , g2 , . . . , gn .
b. Update Wdtcov (g 0 ) = W (g1 ).W (g2 ). . . . .W (gn ) where Wdtcov :
GCdtcov → [0, 1]. The probability of g 0 is the product of the probabilities of g1 , . . . , gn .
8. Return GCdtcov and Wdtcov .
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Algorithm 7 UpdatePP(t) where t is the tuple being processed. It returns
descendants, the set of all tuples that are DFS descendants of tuple t. Variables GC
(the set of all grounded constraints), I (the set of input tuples), C (the set of derived
tuples), P P (a function from each tuple to its polynomial), and visited (a function
that maps each tuple to whether it is processed or not) are assumed to be available
globally.
1. Update visited(t) = true.
2. Initialize descendants = {}. The set descendants collects all tuples that are DFS
descendants of tuple t.
3. Let neighbours = {cg | t ∈ Ag ∧ g ∈ GC}. This is the set of all tuples derivable
from tuple t in one step.
4. For each tuple t0 ∈ neighbours and visited(t0 ) = f alse, do:
(a) Let descendants0 = U pdateP P (t0 ). The recursive call updates the polynomial for tuple t0 . The set descendants0 contains the tuples that are DFS
descendants of tuple t0 .
(b) Update descendants = descendants ∪ {t0 } ∪ descendants0 .
5. Let expr = P P (t). At this point, the polynomials of all tuples transitively derivable
from tuple t are updated to their final form.
6. Remove from expr all terms in which variable xt occurs. A term in which variable
xt occurs represents derivation trees of tuple t that have a cycle.
7. While there is a tuple t00 ∈ descendants such that variable xt00 occurs in a term of
expr, do:
(a) Substitute every occurrence of variable xt00 with polynomial P P (t00 ), in expr.
(b) Remove from expr all terms in which xt occurs.
8. Update P P (t) = expr. At this point, the polynomial for tuple t is updated to its
final form. It now refers to only those variables corresponding to tuples that are
not derivable from tuple t.
9. Return descendants.
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5.4.2

Algorithm

This section gives the algorithm (specified in two parts as Algorithms 6 and 7) to
transform the set of grounded constraints GC to another set of grounded constraints
GCdtcov . At a high level, the algorithm does the following:
1. For each derived tuple, the algorithm records all the derivation trees in the
form of a polynomial expression representing the grounded constraints deriving
that tuple.
2. It simulates a depth first search on an underlying directed graph G = (V, E)
where the set of vertices V represents derived tuples, and there is a directed
edge between two vertices v1 and v2 if the tuple represented by v1 derives the
tuple represented by v2 in one step.
3. The key idea of the algorithm is that it recognizes the presence of a cyclic set of
grounded constraints when it observes that the polynomial expression of tuple
t refers to a variable that corresponds to a DFS descendant of tuple t.
4. It ensures acyclicity of the transformed set of clauses GCdtcov , and preserves
the contributing derivation trees by performing the following actions on the
polynomial expression of each tuple t.
(a) It deletes terms that refer to variable xt (xt succinctly represents all the
derivation trees for tuple t). By Lemmas 5.4.3 and 5.4.4 such terms do
not represent contributing derivation trees.
(b) It transforms the remaining terms until they no longer refer to variables
that represent DFS descendants of tuple t. By Lemma 5.4.5, once this
transformation is performed on the terms of the polynomial expressions of
all the derived tuples, the resulting derivation graph GCdtcov is acyclic.
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GCdtcov retains all contributing derivation trees from GC for any tuple t. Lemma 5.4.2
shows that retaining all contributing derivation trees is a sufficient condition to
compute Pr(t) for a tuple t.
Here is a step-by-step description of the algorithm. Algorithm 6 first records the
polynomial for each derived tuple t, in P P (t), in step 2. The polynomial for tuple
t is in terms of the variables representing its immediate antecedent tuples. Next,
it initializes the book-keeping variables of the algorithm: roots and visited. The
variable visited is global and is visible to Algorithm 7. In step 5, Algorithm 7 is
invoked on a tuple that is derived only from input tuples.
Algorithm 7 recursively visits every tuple that is transitively derivable from its
argument, in a depth-first manner. During this depth first visit, Algorithm 7 updates
the polynomial P P (t) of its argument tuple t after it has completed the recursive
calls on all its depth-first descendants. Therefore, when Algorithm 7 updates the
polynomial for a tuple t, the polynomials for all tuples that tuple t transitively derives,
are already updated. The update step for tuple t entails repeatedly substituting for
every occurrence of variable xt0 by the polynomial P P (t0 ), in the polynomial for tuple
t, where tuple t0 is a DFS descendant of tuple t. This substitution continues as long
as the polynomial for tuple t refers to variables corresponding to DFS descendants of
tuple t, and stops when it refers only to the variables corresponding to the DFS nondescendants of tuple t. At every step of the substitution, if a term in the polynomial
P P (t) refers to xt , that term is discarded as it represents derivation trees for tuple t
that have a cycle in one of their paths. After every derived tuple has been visited,
Algorithm 6 reads off the new grounded constraints and their probabilities from the
updated polynomials for each derived tuple, in steps 6 and 7.
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5.5

Illustrative Example

In this section we illustrate the effect of the three cycle elimination algorithms on a
small example, and show how they are increasingly more precise. Figure 5.1(a) shows
a toy derivation graph that has four clauses g1 , g2 , g3 , g4 .
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Figure 5.1: An example to illustrate the effect of the three cycle elimination algorithms.
(a) is an example graph, (b) is after Aggressive cycle elimination, (c) is after DFSbased cycle elimination, and (d) is after DT-covering cycle elimination. Observe the
increasing precision of these algorithms.
Aggressive cycle elimination removes the clauses g3 and g4 from the derivation
graph to make it cycle-free. A contributing derivation for tuple u ({g2 , g4 }) is lost.
Similarly, a contributing derivation for tuple v ({g1 , g3 }) is also lost. Figure 5.1(b)
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shows the derivation graph after aggressive cycle elimination is applied to it.
DFS-based cycle elimination puts the clause g3 back into the cycle-free derivation
graph produced by the aggressive cycle elimination algorithm, because it confirms
that adding clause g3 will maintain the acyclicity of the resulting graph. Therefore,
the DFS-based algorithm retains all contributing derivations for tuple v but still loses
a contributing derivation for tuple u. Figure 5.1(c) shows the derivation graph after
DFS-based cycle elimination is applied to it.
The DT-covering cycle elimination algorithm retains clauses g1 , g2 and g3 but
recognizes that it cannot retain clause g4 because it will introduce a cycle. Instead,
it introduces a “new” clause g5 . Observe that clause g5 is actually a compression
of clauses g2 and g4 . Accordingly, the probability associated with clause g5 is the
product of the probabilities associated with clauses g2 and g4 . Now, a contributing
derivation tree {g2 , g4 } for tuple u that was previously lost, is substituted by the
derivation tree {g5 }. In this way, the DT-covering cycle elimination algorithm retains
all contributing derivations for all tuples of a derivation graph. Figure 5.1(d) shows
the derivation graph after DT-covering cycle elimination is applied to it.
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Chapter 6
Related Work
There is a large body of research on techniques to overcome the incompleteness of
static program analysis tools. Muske et al [62] give a detailed survey of different
techniques used by static analyses for alarm handling, their merits and shortcomings.
We broadly classify this research into techniques based purely on static reasoning,
techniques that interact with users, techniques that interact with dynamic analyses,
and techniques that take a statistical approach. We elaborate below on each of these
categories.
Techniques based purely on static program reasoning. Lee et al [48] cluster
correlated alarms by discovering sound dependencies between them such that if the
dominant alarms of a cluster turns out to be false, all the other alarms in the same
cluster are guaranteed to be false. Le and Soffa [46], and also Zhang et al [80] define
two alarms to be correlated if one alarm causes the other alarm to occur. Le and
Soffa [46] first statically detect alarms and determine their error states. Next, they
propagate the effects of error states along paths, to automatically detect correlated
pairs of alarms. From this, they construct a correlation graph showing correlations
among multiple alarms along different paths. Using the correlation graph, they
minimize the number of reported alarms required to find the root cause of an alarm.
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Kahlon et al [35] statically detect datarace alarms, and track lock acquisition patterns
to detect alarms that may potentially be false. Since their technique is unsound, they
use it to rank alarms rather than filter them. Sherriff et al [75] also use unsound
methods that leverage historical field failure records to group static analysis alarms
that are predictive of a field failure. However, all such techniques are constrained by
the limits of logical reasoning, and cannot extract fine correlations between alarms
(such as, “If a is false, then b is also likely to be false.”).
Techniques that interact with users. These techniques interact with a user in
order to reduce false positives in alarm reports. They either take some specifications
provided by a user, or they pose queries to a user, which they identify by reasoning
about the logical structure of the analysis and the program in question. Dillig et al [22]
formulate a search for missing facts to discharge an alarm as an abductive inference
problem. Ivy [66] graphically displays succinct counterexamples to the user to help
identify inductive invariants. URSA [81] formulates the search for the root causes
of false alarms in Datalog derivation graphs as an information gain maximization
problem. While all these systems pose queries to a user, some of these systems pose
queries about program facts that are related to an alarm, and not about the alarm
itself. For example, URSA poses queries on the root cause of an alarm. Depending on
the complexity of the static analysis, such queries may place an undue burden on a
user. Some techniques classify alarms with a single round of user feedback [55]. But,
unlike Bingo, all these techniques do not iteratively maximize the return on a user’s
effort expended on providing correct feedback. Le and Soffa [47] propose a framework
that requires as input a user-provided specification in order to automatically generate
scalable, interprocedural, path-sensitive analyses to detect user-specified alarms. This
specification needs to express alarms and information needed for their detection, a
scalable, path-sensitive algorithm, and a generator that unifies the two. The analysis
produced from this specification identifies alarms and also the path segments where

95

the root causes of an alarm are located. Other techniques leverage analysis-derived
features, e.g., to assign confidence values to alarms [51], but they rely on expert users
to assign weights to analysis rules.
Techniques that interact with dynamic analysis. The goal of such techniques
is to reap the benefits of the soundness of static analysis, while offsetting its incompleteness with the completeness of dynamic analysis, or testing. Csallner et al [20]
present an automatic error-detection technique that combines static checking and
concrete test-case generation. Their approach is to produce concrete test cases by
deriving specific error conditions from the abstract error conditions inferred by a
static analysis. These test cases are then executed to determine whether an error
truly exists. In a later work, Csallner et al [21] propose a 3-step approach to bugfinding. The first step is dynamic invariant detection to capture a program’s intended
behavior, the second step is to statically analyze the program within the restricted
input domain allowed by the detected invariants, and the third step is automatically
generate test cases directed by the predictions of the static analysis. They claim
higher precision over tools that lack a dynamic step and higher efficiency over tools
that lack a static step. In yet another work, Li et al [50] enlist the support of a
dynamic technique that automatically validates and categorizes the numerous, but
potentially false, memory-leak warnings reported by a static memory-leak detector.
Kiss et al [38] also combine static and dynamic analysis techniques to detect vulnerabilities, and illustrate how their tool finds a simplified version of the Heartbleed [3]
bug. They further illustrate the complexities involved in detecting this bug in its
original manifestation. In an early work, Ramalingam et al [71] develop a precise
formulation of the problem of determining the likelihood of an analysis fact holding
true during execution. This formulation associates a probability with each edge of
a control flow graph, which they suggest can be estimated by dynamic techniques.
This paper motivated the instantiation of our approach in Presto.
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Techniques that take a statistical approach. Such techniques leverage various
kinds of program features to statistically determine which alarms are likely bugs.
The z-ranking algorithm [42, 41] uses the observation that alarms within physical
proximity of each other (e.g., within the same function or file) are correlated in their
ground truth and applies a statistical technique called the z-test to rank alarms.
More recently, other kinds of program features have been used to statistically classify
analysis alarms [39, 11, 34, 77]. Further out, there is a large body of work on using
statistical techniques for mining likely specifications and reporting anomalies as
bugs (e.g., [60, 52, 43, 72]) and for improving the performance of static analyzers
(e.g., [32, 33, 17]). In particular, Banerjee et al [52] propose a new algorithm for
automatically inferring explicit information flow specification from program code.
In order to infer this, they model information flow paths in a propagation graph
constructed from program code, using probabilistic constraints. They solve the system
of probabilistic constraints using probabilistic inference on factor graphs.
There has also been extensive research to combine logical and probabilistic
reasoning in AI. It starts with Pearl [67, 68], and other examples include Bayesian
networks and Markov networks. Koller and Friedman’s comprehensive textbook [40]
gives a thorough treatment of these techniques. A more recent challenge involves
extending these models to capture richer logical formalisms such as Horn clauses
and first-order logic. This has resulted in frameworks such as probabilistic relational
models [29], Markov logic networks [74, 65], Bayesian logic programs [36], and
probabilistic languages such as Blog [57], ProbLog [25], and Infer.NET [58].
There are several methods to perform marginal inference in Bayesian networks.
Examples include exact methods, such as variable elimination, the junction tree
algorithm [37], and symbolic techniques [28], approximate methods based on belief
propagation [44, 59], and those based on sampling, such as Gibbs sampling or MCMC
search. Recent advances on the random generation of SAT witnesses [18] also fall in
this area. In our work, we use the loopy belief propagation algorithm for discrete
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approximate inference. Murphy et al [61] describe an empirical study performed to
evaluate the loopy belief propagation algorithm as an approximate inference algorithm
in a general setting. They found that the algorithm often converges, and when it
does, it does converge to a good approximation of the correct marginal as computed
by exact inference. They also perform some initial investigation into the cause of
oscillations, when the algorithm oscillated without convergence on one probabilistic
network. They conclude that simple methods of preventing such oscillations do not
allow the algorithm to converge to (approximately) correct marginals.
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Chapter 7
Future Directions
While this work demonstrates how probabilistic reasoning can complement program
reasoning to improve the effectiveness of automated reasoning tools, it also raises
many intriguing research questions. In addition, the generality of this approach opens
up many avenues to harness probabilistic reasoning in innovative ways to augment
logical reasoning. We discuss below some interesting ways in which this research can
be taken forward.
Incorporating extra-analytic features. Our probabilistic model, as defined in
this dissertation, only captures the program features recognized by the underlying
static program analysis. For example, the datarace analysis executed by Bingo does
not recognize or poorly recognizes program features like (a) program control flow
paths, (b) access of the fields of the this object in a constructor, (c) programmatic
constructs like flags and conditionals to avoid racy accesses or (d) intersecting locksets
guarding two memory accesses that may potentially race with each other. Failure to
capture such program features makes the deductive steps of a static program analysis
incomplete, eventually leading the static analysis to report false alarms. While the
incomplete deductive steps are modeled by our probabilistic model, the cause of
incompleteness, such as the above program features, are not modeled. Therefore,
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when our probabilistic model recomputes alarm probabilities by conditioning them
on evidence of the ground truth obtained by, say, a user, the generalization is
sometimes poor and sometimes even erratic. Simply put, when our probabilistic
model recomputes alarm probabilities by conditioning them on user feedback, it is
possible that it lowers the probability of a true bug, or increases the probability
of a false alarm. It is well-known that incorporating such program features into a
static program analysis will make the analysis unscalable and practically unusable.
Therefore, an interesting research direction will be to explore ways in which extraanalytic program features can be represented in the probabilistic model with a goal
to maximize the generalization from user feedback (or, in other words, maximize the
generalization from observations). This has the potential to improve alarm ranking.
Improving inference time. Static program analyses that execute at industry scale
analyze large and complex programs. As a result, they produce very large derivation
graphs, which in turn convert to extremely large Bayesian networks. Inference over
such large networks is very time consuming. The size of the network also negatively
impacts the convergence of inference algorithms to stable probability distributions.
Moreover, in the context of Bingo, marginal inference is performed several times
in an iterative manner. The speed of inference is the main reason why Bingo does
not qualify as an interactive tool. Therefore, in its current form, it is impractical to
incorporate Bingo as part of an integrated software development environment. In
this context, substantially improving inference time is a useful direction for research.
Improving inference time can be tackled in two ways. One way is to work on the
inference engine. In this dissertation, we have used a general off-the-shelf engine to
perform discrete approximate inference. We could investigate ways to customize the
inference algorithm to the context of program analysis in order to improve inference
time. Another way is to optimize the derivation graph or the Bayesian network: to
reduce its size until inference time over the resulting network is within acceptable
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limits. For this, one could investigate principled ways to elide or coalesce parts of
the derivation graph that may be determined to be irrelevant to the root cause of
a reported alarm. We could also examine if a large monolithic derivation graph
could be divided into modular components on which inference could be independently
performed, summarized, and later composed.
Learning rule probabilities. In the Bayesian network constructed by our end-toend system Bingo, we quantify the incompleteness of every deductive step executed
by the static analysis, by a fixed number 0.999. That is, we say that if all the
antecedent facts of a deductive step hold true, then the consequent, or the conclusion
of the deductive step, holds true with a likelihood of 0.999. We make this simplistic
initialization to seed the alarm probabilities, and rely on iteratively improving the
inferred alarm probabilities by conditioning on evidence. As the deductive rules of a
static analysis are not all uniformly incomplete, an interesting research direction is to
explore the possibility of learning rule probabilities from training data. If perfectly
labelled training data were available, then the rule probability (that captures its
incompleteness) will be the fraction of times the rule produced a true conclusion
when all its premises held true. Since it is very unlikely that fully labelled data is
available, we could use techniques like Expectation Maximization on training data to
learn maximum likelihood estimates for rule probabilities.
Incorporating richer inputs from a user or from a dynamic analysis. In
our end-to-end system Bingo, we iteratively improve the alarm ranking by seeking
feedback from a user. In each iteration, Bingo produces an alarm ranking, seeks
feedback from a user for the top-ranked alarm, and recomputes the probabilities of
all alarms conditioned on this evidence to produce an improved ranking. In our work,
we have taken the greedy approach of seeking user feedback for a single alarm, which
is the top-ranked alarm in each iteration. Besides, our implementation seeks only a
boolean true/false feedback for each proposed alarm. We could make the interactive
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loop in Bingo potentially more effective by:
1. Casting the problem of choosing one or more alarms for seeking feedback in
each iteration as a problem of finding an optimal strategy in a Markov decision
process.
2. Seeking more fine-grained feedback from a user (likely false, likely true, a
probability estimate), or a likely explanation in some form (an alarm is false
because some other analysis fact is false), in each iteration. In addition to
improving alarm ranking, richer feedback may also help mitigate the impact of
erroneous feedback.
In our end-to-end system Presto, we seek probability estimates for input analysis
facts from a dynamic analysis. We could investigate how to get more precise probability estimates from the dynamic analysis by providing it with more context for
each analysis fact. For example, instead of asking the dynamic analysis to estimate
how often an analysis fact, say x, holds true, we could ask the dynamic analysis to
estimate how often the analysis fact x holds true in the context of a different analysis
fact y holding true.
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Chapter 8
Concluding Remarks
In this dissertation, we tackle the problem of improving the effectiveness of bugfinding static program analysis tools in practical settings. Specifically, we propose a
principled and general approach to augment program reasoning with probabilistic
reasoning in order to rank alarms reported by these tools, where the alarms are
ranked by their likelihood of being true alarms. This enables tool users to focus their
efforts on triaging alarms at the top of the ranking, which are more likely to be true
than the alarms lower in the ranking, thereby mitigating the burden of inspecting
false alarms.
The approach developed in this dissertation constructs a probabilistic model,
which is a Bayesian network, from the deductive steps applied by a static program
analysis. The probabilistic model models (a) the dependence of these deductive
steps on the analysis facts that they are premised upon, and (b) the dependence
of the analysis facts on the deductive steps that derive them. In this manner, the
model captures the transitive dependence of analysis facts on other analysis facts,
thereby elegantly capturing correlations, or shared dependencies between alarms.
Furthermore, the model quantifies the incompleteness of each analysis fact and
deductive step. Marginal inference on this probabilistic model associates a posterior
probability with each alarm indicating how complete (or, how true) the alarm may
103

be.
We further demonstrate the generality and the empirical effectiveness of this
approach by instantiating it in two practical end-to-end systems. The first end-to-end
system called Bingo instantiates this approach to rank the alarms reported by two
static analyses: the datarace analysis and the taint analysis. Bingo also demonstrates
how alarm ranking based on the inferred probabilities iteratively improves when the
probabilities are conditioned on evidence gathered by interacting with a human user.
The second system called Presto instantiates this approach to rank the alarms
reported by an exception flow analysis. Further, Presto demonstrates the feasibility
of producing an effective alarm ranking by seeking probability estimates from a
dynamic analysis, for incomplete input facts that the analysis is premised upon.
In the last part of the dissertation, we explore the important problem of eliminating
directed cycles from derivation graphs that capture the deductive steps applied by a
static analysis. We give three algorithms for cycle elimination that are increasingly
precise in the number of derivation trees they retain.
In conclusion, the approach of augmenting logical program reasoning with probabilistic reasoning is a very general approach to associate richer information with the
conclusions drawn by a static analysis. Moreover, this approach gives us a principled
way to tailor static analyses to individual codebases and user needs. As demonstrated
in the dissertation, this approach can be harnessed to make static program analyses
more effective in practical environments.
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